FLOYD WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Floyd Williams was convicted of armed burglary and robbery on circumstantial evidence and a principals theory. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding reversible error in the admission of collateral crime evidence regarding his recent jail release and the prosecutor's improper closing argument suggesting he had gotten into trouble in Miami.
The court held that both the admission of the collateral crime evidence regarding recent jail release and the prosecutor's improper closing argument constituted reversible error. The state failed to overcome the presumption of harmful error, necessitating reversal and a new trial.
[1] Evidence of a defendant's prior incarceration or release from jail, if not relevant to a material issue, is inadmissible collateral crime evidence.
[2] The improper admission of irrelevant collateral crime evidence creates a presumption of harmful error, requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ver…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the danger that the jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged”
Establishes the presumption of harmful error when collateral crime evidence is admitted, as juries may infer propensity to commit the charged crime
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was convicted of armed burglary and robbery with a firearm, along with two co-defendants who were convicted of these and other crimes. The co…
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FARMER, Judge.
Defendant was convicted of armed burglary and robbery with a firearm on largely circumstantial evidence and the theory of principals. His two co-defendants were convicted of these and other crimes. On appeal he argues that it was error to admit evidence that' he was recently released from jail and in failing to grant a mistrial for closing argument by the prosecutor that defendant had “gotten himself in trouble in Miami” when there was no evidence to that effect. We agree and reverse.
Any implication of collateral crimes, not relevant to any material issue, should not be admitted. Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1990), (reference by witness to defendant as “escaped convict” held to be inadmissible collateral crime evidence). When a defendant moves for a mistrial based on the improper admission of collateral crime evidence, the motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). When this kind of irrelevant evidence is admitted, however, there is a presumption that the error was harmful, because of
“the danger that the jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.”
Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 556, 70 L.Ed.2d 418 (1981). A reviewing court may affirm the conviction only if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict could not have been affected, and a showing that the evidence against a defendant was “overwhelming” is insufficient. Castro v. State, 547 So. 2d 111 (Fla.1989).
We do not think the state has overcome the presumption of harmful error in this case. Defendant was convicted upon circumstantial evidence of guilt, and under the law of principals. The evidence adduced, while certainly enough to permit a conviction, was not so one-sided as to withstand the prejudicial effect of the testimony about just being out of jail. The jury was necessarily required to draw inferences from the evidence presented, and defendant’s previous incarceration could reasonably have swayed the jury to draw the most negative possible inferences. We are unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not affect the verdict, and accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial. Czubak, 570 So. 2d 925.
During the state’s closing argument, the prosecutor made the following assertion:
“Now, we don’t know what kind of trouble Floyd had gotten himself into when he went to Miami, but Floyd had gotten himself in some kind of trouble in Miami. These two young guys that come up — ”
At that point, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. In opposing the motion, the prosecutor said:
“Judge, I don’t see any error at all. He was in Miami. Some reason he left Miami to come up here to pull this robbery. I am saying we don’t know.”
The trial judge sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s comments, but he refused to grant a mistrial. This too was error. While we might not have reversed solely on the basis of this comment, when consid ered against the background of the testimony about just being released from jail, we find the argument intolerably prejudicial. Once again it is necessary to admonish a prosecutor that the price of such zeal is a reversal, with its attendant costs and burdens to the people of Florida. This experienced prosecutor undoubtedly knows that it is quite improper to argue in a criminal case without any evidence at all that a defendant left another place to come here because he “got into trouble” in that place. Where, as is true in this case, the evidence is fairly close and circumstantial, this kind of argument can only serve to tip the scales unfairly.
REVERSED FOR NEW TRIAL.
GUNTHER, C.J., and POLEN, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2001)…ted the jury to ignore it. However, it is apparent that this evidence effectively amounted to improper collateral crimes evidence which, under our case law, is presumed harmful, see Castro v. State, 547 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989); Williams v. State, 692 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and would most certainly have tainted the jury’s recommendation, despite the trial court’s instruction to disregard it. See Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla.1993). The initial and erroneous admission of such devasta…
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Rivera v. State, 745 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…as to vitiate the entire trial,” Hamilton v. State, 703 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1997), or when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. See Power v. State 605 So. 2d 856 (Fla.1992). We recognize that in Williams v. State, 692 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), this court, quoting Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla.1981), stated that improper collateral crime evidence is presumptively harmful because of “the danger that the jury will take the bad character or propensity to cr…
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Colsson D. Ford v. State, 702 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…The jury could have surmised that the prosecutor knew of prior complaints against defendant that had not been otherwise revealed to them. The implication of a defendant in other crimes is considered presumptively prejudicial. See Williams v. State, 692 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Cuthbertson v. State, 623 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The presumption of prejudice arises because of “the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guil…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- LeDuc v. Florida, 444 U.S. 885 (U.S. 1979)
- Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1981)
- Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1990)
- Tucker v. Zant, 454 U.S. 1022 (U.S. 1981)
- Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978)
- Castro v. State, 547 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1989)