MAURICE ANTONIO MANN, PETITIONER,
v.
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT; PEDRO ARENCIBIA, PETITIONER, V. HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE F. DENNIS ALVAREZ, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-05-09
Nos. 97-00566, 97-00962
BLUE, A.C.J., and LAZZARA and FULMER, JJ., concur.
693 So. 2d 117 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The Second District Court of Appeal certified petitions for writ of certiorari challenging the Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit's creation of a Drug Division by administrative order, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to create subject matter divisions except by local rule. The court certified the matter to the Florida Supreme Court due to its statewide impact on hundreds of pending cases and potential jurisdictional issues.


Holding

The district court declined to address the merits, instead certifying the petitions to the Florida Supreme Court as requiring immediate resolution due to the statewide administrative implications and the Supreme Court's exclusive authority to review judicial assignments and trial court administrative supervision.


Headnotes

[1] A district court may certify to the supreme court that consolidated petitions for writ of certiorari require immediate resolution when the pending issues have a great eff…

[2] The creation of a specialized case management division within an existing subject matter division of a circuit court by administrative order, rather than by local rule, m…

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Key Quotes

“there is nothing in our Constitution to indicate that district courts are to share in the administrative supervision of our trial courts, and we decline to read our Constitution to sanction the disruption to the judicial system inherent in such shared authority.”

Establishes the Supreme Court's exclusive authority over trial court administrative matters and the legal basis for certification rather than district court resolution.

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Facts & Procedural History

On January 15, 1997, the Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit filed Administrative Order No. S-04-29-97-003, creating the Drug Division cons…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

Certification of Orders Requiring Immediate Resolution by the Supreme Court

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.125, and on its own motion, this court certifies that the consolidated petitions for writ of certiorari referenced above require immediate resolution by the supreme court because the issues pending in the district court have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state. Resolution of the issues presented will affect the validity of the judgments rendered in hundreds of cases and will clarify the authority of a chief judge to devise plans for specialized case management of subgroups of cases within an existing subject matter division of a circuit (i.e., drug cases in the felony division).

On January 15, 1997, the Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit filed Administrative Order No. S-04-29-97-003, creating the Drug Division, consisting of criminal divisions “X” and “Y,” which is described as “a specialized section of the Criminal Justice Division to handle drug cases.” Petitioners filed motions with the trial court asserting that the chief judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction by creating a subject matter division by administrative order which can only be created by local rule.

This matter requires immediate resolution because the clerk of this court has already received over one hundred notices of appeal from judgments rendered in the drug division and it appears that the public defender is filing a notice of appeal on virtually every judgment issued by the drug division. Furthermore, it appears that jurisdiction to address the issue raised by these petitions may rest exclusively in the supreme court. “[TJhere is nothing in our Constitution to indicate that district courts are to share in the administrative supervision of our trial courts, and we decline to read our Constitution to sanction the disruption to the judicial system inherent in such shared authority.” Wild v. Dozier, 672 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla.1996); see Holsman v. Cohen, 667 So. 2d 769, 770-71 (Fla.1996) (supreme court has exclusive au thority to review judicial assignments); see also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.050(e)(2).

This court further certifies that if it is determined that the division was improperly formed, the effect of that determination on all judgments and orders rendered in the division should also be resolved.

Although the creation of a special division for drug cases is not precisely analogous to the creation of family law divisions, which was directed by legislation, it is important that the issues raised in these petitions be “addressed in an expeditious, efficient, and deliberative manner” and that they do not become “bogged down in an administrative morass.” In re Report of the Comm. on Family Courts, 646 So. 2d 178, 182 (Fla.1994). For the reasons set forth herein, we respectfully request that this court accept jurisdiction pursuant to rule 9.125(g).

BLUE, A.C.J., and LAZZARA and FULMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Adkins, 71 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …e, 983 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); State v. Goode, 779 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Hootman, 697 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Mann v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 693 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Schultz v. TM Florida-Ohio Realty Ltd. P’ship, 553 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In all probability, no order ever appealed to this court has been a better [*186] example of an order warranting certification under this rule.…
  • 1-888-Traffic Schs. v. Chief Circuit Judge, 734 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999)
    …3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (denying certiorari petition challenging administrative order as an attempt to legislate). Although the First District Court in this case and the Second District Court, in Mann v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 693 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA),2 on certification, 696 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.1997), have read the Wild decision as abolishing this long-standing mechanism for challenging routine administrative orders,3 such was not this Court’s [*416] intent. In fact, in Mann v. Chief J…

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