WILLIAM LLOYD GIRTMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
IVA HAUCK GIRTMAN, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-04-04
Nos. 95-02720, 95-04588
ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
693 So. 2d 631 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

In this divorce appeal, the former husband challenges the trial court's division of marital assets, award of permanent alimony, and custody determination. The appellate court affirmed all aspects of the final judgment of dissolution, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of its rulings. The findings regarding the Lake House and promissory note valuation are supported by competent and substantial evidence. The award of permanent alimony was reasonable given the marriage duration, the wife's extended absence from the workforce, and her age at dissolution. The custody award was not an abuse of discretion, and the husband failed to provide evidence supporting his challenge.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's findings of fact regarding equitable interests and asset valuations will be affirmed on appeal if supported by competent and substantial evidence in the r…

[2] An award of permanent periodic alimony is not an abuse of discretion when a spouse has a long history of remaining out of the workforce to care for children and maintain…

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Key Quotes

“In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should apply the 'reasonableness' test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion.”

Establishes the standard of review for discretionary trial court decisions in family law matters

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Facts & Procedural History

The husband was awarded assets worth $378,363 and directed to pay $33,464 in marital debts, while the wife received assets worth $344,613. The wife ha…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, the former husband raises four challenges to the final judgment of dissolution. We find no abuse of discretion in any of the trial court’s rulings and, therefore, affirm.

The husband was awarded assets worth $378,363 and directed to pay $33,464 in marital debts. The wife was awarded assets worth $344,613. The husband challenges the trial court’s findings of fact regarding a $50,-000 equitable interest in the “Lake House,” as well as the valuation of a promissory note. Because there is competent and substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings, we must affirm these findings which, in turn, requires a conclusion that the trial court’s distribution of marital assets is not an abuse of discretion.

The husband also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding permanent periodic alimony as opposed to rehabilitative alimony. He argues that the wife would have no need for permanent alimony if she became employed in a position commensurate with her educational training. The evidence was in dispute regarding the income level the wife could be expected to earn in a full time position. More importantly, it was undisputed that beginning in 1977 the wife remained at home to care for the children and maintain the household. She did not work until approximately six years prior to the separation, when she began to do part-time accounting work during the spring tax seasons. Given the duration of the marriage, the length of time that the wife had been out of the work force and the fact that she was approaching age fifty at the time of the dissolution, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding permanent alimony. Furthermore, based on the income levels of the husband and wife at the time of the final hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the husband to pay one-half of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.

Finally, the husband asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding primary residential custody of the minor children to the wife. However, the husband failed to direct our attention to any evidence in the record to support his challenge and we can find none on our own. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. We remind the parties that the standard of review of the trial court’s discretionary power is narrow. The supreme court defined the standard of review in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980):

In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should apply the ‘reasonableness’ test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed only when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.

Applying this standard to the subject appeal, we affirm in all respects.

Affirmed.

ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Thomas v. Juanza Perkins and John R. Perkins, 723 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …ld to determine the amount of fees and costs. In the absence of a record of the evidence considered by the trial court in making this award, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion and must therefore affirm. See Girtman v. Girtman, 693 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Novom v. Novom, 513 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Affirmed.…
  • Payne v. Cudjoe Gardens Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 837 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …of a party is pending.”); Henderson v. Reyes, 702 So. 2d 616, 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(reversing the entry of Summary Judgment where depositions had not been completed and a request for the production of documents was outstanding.); Collazo v. Hupert, 693 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that a trial court should not entertain a motion for summary judgment while discovery is still pending); Spradley v. Stick, 622 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Singer v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).…
  • Birgit Henderson v. Riama S. Reyes, 702 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …For the following reasons, we reverse. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Reyes while there were depositions that had not been completed and an outstanding request for the production of documents. See Collazo v. Hupert, 693 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that while “discovery was still pending, the trial court should not have entertained a motion for summary judgment until such discovery was concluded.”) Hence, the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor…

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