JOHN SWEET, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed John Sweet's convictions for robbery and burglary of a conveyance with battery, holding that the trial court improperly excluded cross-examination evidence about Sweet's cocaine use and drug problem, which was central to his voluntary intoxication defense.
The trial court erred in prohibiting the cross-examination and excluding the evidence. Once the state presented a portion of the appellant's statement through the arresting officer, fairness required that the appellant be allowed to present his entire statement to the jury, including the portions about his drug problem that were relevant to his voluntary intoxication defense.
[1] A trial court errs by prohibiting cross-examination concerning a defendant's statements relevant to a defense of voluntary intoxication.
[2] The rule of completeness requires a party introducing a portion of a defendant's statement to also introduce any other part that in fairness ought to be considered contem…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court erred by prohibiting cross-examination concerning Appellant telling the officer that he had been smoking cocaine and had a bad drug problem, and by refusing to allow the witness to testify about the rest of Appellant's statement. The testimony in question was relevant to Appellant's defense of voluntary intoxication.”
Establishes the core error—exclusion of evidence central to the defendant's defense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt trial, the arresting officer testified on direct examination that the appellant admitted committing the robbery. The appellant had told the officer…
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STONE, Judge.
We reverse Appellant’s convictions for robbery and burglary of a conveyance with a battery.
At trial, the arresting officer testified on direct that Appellant admitted committing the robbery. The trial court erred by prohibiting cross-examination concerning Appellant telling the officer that he had been smoking cocaine and had a bad drug problem, and by refusing to allow the witness to testify about the rest of Appellant’s statement. The testimony in question was relevant to Appellant’s defense of voluntary intoxication. The only other evidence at trial concerning Appellant’s drug problem was his own testimony, a point emphasized by the state in final argument.
Once the state presented a portion of Appellant’s statement, he should have been allowed, in the interest of fairness, to have the jury hear his entire statement. E.g., Christopher v. State, 583 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla.1991); Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 401 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996); Eberhardt v. State, 550 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Generally, a party may not introduce his own exculpatory statements. However, the “rule of completeness” recognized in section 90.108, Florida Statutes, provides:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.
In Christopher, the supreme court recognized that where the state offers a part of a confession or admission, the defendant is entitled to bring out the entire statement on cross-examination. The court, in Christopher, also approved of Eberhardt in broadening the rule to include verbal communication.
In Eberhardt, the court held that where portions of a conversation are admitted on direct examination, the rule of completeness allows admission of the relevant balance of the conversation necessary to give the jury a complete understanding of the context of the conversation. In that ease, as here, the defendant was attempting to cross-examine the officer about the defendant’s telling the officer that he was intoxicated when he committed the crime.
In Larzelere, the supreme court recognized that the rule is not automatic and that it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine that the rest of the statement does not fall within a category that “in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.” Id. at 402. There, unlike in this case, the withheld evidence had little relevance and did not appear very important so that its exclusion was harmless. Here, on the other hand, the evidence is not only relevant, it goes to the heart of Appellant’s defense.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed.
PARIENTE and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2001)…(explaining that mistrial should have been granted where inference from detective’s hearsay testimony was that the police investigation had produced evidence that defendant was the murderer). Finally, we reject Evans’ reliance upon Sweet v. State, 693 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), Williams v. State, 689 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and Johnson v. State, 653 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), for the proposition that the “rule of completeness” demands that Evans be allowed to elicit hearsay in cross-examina…
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Harmon v. State, 854 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The defense has the right to present the whole of the conversation, Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 [*702] (Fla.1982), as a matter of fairness, Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 402 (Fla.1996). See also Sweet v. State, 693 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that the defense may present the entire conversation where “it goes to the heart of the ... defense”); Eberhardt v. State, 550 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (holding that the rule of completeness generally allows a…
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Metz v. State, 59 So. 3d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ing his explanation that he did not know the car was stolen because his girlfriend had given it to him; as in this case, the excluded statement in Guerrero related to the defendant’s state of mind while possessing stolen property. In Sweet v. State, 693 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we held that subsection 90.108(1) required admission of that portion of the defendant’s statement that related to his defense of voluntary intoxication. See also Mason, 719 So. 2d at 304-05 (holding that trial court erroneo…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1996)
- Kennedy Eberhardt v. State, 550 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Christopher v. State, 583 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1991)