EDWARD M. THRUSTON, II, APPELLANT,
v.
CAROL CONLEY, APPELLEE
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Trial court erred in modifying property distribution in a dissolution judgment under the guise of enforcing it; modification of settled property rights is improper.
A trial court cannot modify the property distribution scheme of a final dissolution judgment when purporting to enforce it.
[1] A trial court may not modify property rights adjudicated in a final dissolution judgment, even when purporting to enforce compliance with payment obligations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This re-shuffling of property rights, which were settled in the final judgment of dissolution, was error.”
Court's explanation of why the trial court's modification of the 401k and pension interests was improper.
In a dissolution judgment, the former husband was ordered to pay certain liabilities on a bus and van and was given interests in the former wife's 401…
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STEVENSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order enforcing a final judgment. We reverse because the trial court erred when it purported to “enforce” the final judgment of dissolution by modifying the property distribution scheme, which had previously been adjudicated and set forth therein.
In the final judgment of dissolution, the former husband was ordered to pay certain liabilities for a bus and a van, and was given interests in the former wife’s 401k and pension plans. When the former husband did not pay the liens on the bus and van, one creditor obtained a judgment against the former wife, and the other obtained a judgment against both former spouses. The former wife then moved to “enforce” the provision of the final judgment requiring the former husband to settle the debts. In granting her motion, the trial court reduced the former husband’s interest in the 401k and pension plans by $16,840.02, the total amount of the creditors’ judgments. This re-shuffling of property rights, which were settled in the final judgment of dissolution, was error. See Horne v. Horne, 417 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 429 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1983); see also Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)(en banc).
Accordingly, we reverse the “order enforcing final judgment” and remand to the trial court for further proceedings at which it may consider other means of enforcing the former husband’s compliance with the final judgment of dissolution.
GLICKSTEIN and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Janovic v. Janovic, 814 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…trial court may not, in the guise of an enforcement proceeding, read [*1101] dress the distribution of property when the property has been previously distributed, see DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Thruston v. Conley, 693 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), nor may the trial court reallocate property based on an involuntary change in circumstances. A trial court, however, retains jurisdiction to enforce a final dissolution judgment. See Work v. Provine, 632 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla.…
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Scott v. Scott, 888 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…s, a lower court does not have jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in a judgment of dissolution.”) (citing Harman v. Harman, 523 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)); see also Thruston v. Conley, 693 So. 2d 1070, 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that the trial court erred in purporting to “enforce” the final judgment of dissolution by “re-shuffling” property rights and modifying the previously adjudicated property distribution scheme) (citations omitted).…
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Spencer v. Spencer, 898 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…judgments cannot be used to modify property’rights unless the court specifically reserved jurisdiction to do so. See Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Agerskov v. Gabriel, 596 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Thruston v. Conley, 693 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Here, the injunction' prohibits Mr. Spencer from disposing of “all of the marital tangible personal property previously held at, and taken away from, the former marital residence.” It does not differentiate between those items…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Horne v. Horne, 417 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)