STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHRISTOPHER GIRARD, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed suppression of crack cocaine evidence found during a traffic stop for an inoperative tag light, holding that under Whren v. U.S., a stop is valid when an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law was violated, regardless of whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop.
A traffic stop is valid when an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law violation occurred, even if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop.
[1] A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law was violated, even if the officer's subjective motivation w…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice stopped Girard's vehicle for having an inoperative tag light and found crack cocaine on the vehicle's floor.…
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PETERSON, Chief Judge.
The state appeals an order suppressing evidence of crack cocaine found on the floor of Girard’s vehicle after he was stopped by the police for having an inoperative tag light. The trial court found the stop to be pretextual but on rehearing concluded that it erred in light of Whren v. U.S., — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), decided on the same day the suppression order was rendered. The state, however, prior to filing its motion for rehearing, had already filed a notice of appeal to this court thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction.
In Whren, the Supreme Court rejected the reasonable officer test approved by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Daniel 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1995), reh. denied, and Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988). The Supreme Court held that a stop of a motorist is permissible when an officer has probable cause to believe that the motorist has violated a traffic law, even if a reasonable officer would not have detained the motorist for such a violation. It is undisputed that Girard’s tag light was inoperative and did not comply with the traffic laws. Therefore, the motorist stop is valid since the officers had probable cause to detain Girard. We reverse the order granting Girard’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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State v. Robinson, 756 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1997); State v. Chaney, 744 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Covington v. State, 728 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Girard, 694 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The subjective intent of the police officer who made the stop as whether the officer would have stopped another vehicle for that infraction and whether he and the canine unit were on a hunt for suspected drug dealers is not rele…
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Bowers v. Jenne, 710 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…notice to counsel for the defendant. Here, the state did not move to increase bond on the grounds identified by the trial court, and no prior notice was given to Petitioner. A trial court may not increase bond on its own motion. Flemming v. Cochran, 694 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). To the extent that the trial court increased bond on the grounds of Petitioner’s prior record or evidence against him, this is improper because the state did not show that this information was not available to the committing ma…
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Cousino v. Jenne, 717 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…oking petitioner’s bond and remanding him into custody on July 13, 1998. That led to this petition for "writ of habeas corpus. The trial court impermissibly increased bond on its own motion, which it is without authority to do. Flemming v. Cochran, 694 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Merdian v. Cochran, 654 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Keane v. Cochran, 614 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(d)(2) provides that bond may be modified on motion by the state showing goo…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1995)