LARRY R. MOSCHINI, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
INTER-GOLD ITALIA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND OTHERS, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-04-25
No. 96-02070
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., concur.
694 So. 2d 774 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

In this promissory note case, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Inter-Gold Italia's motion for directed verdict, holding that undisputed evidence established Inter-Gold was never intended to be bound by the note despite the lender's argument that Inter-Gold held itself out as doing business under the name of the obligor.


Holding

Inter-Gold Italia was not bound by the promissory note. The undisputed facts that Pietro Moschini refused to sign the note unless Inter-Gold was deleted, and that Inter-Gold's name was removed before signing, establish that the parties never intended Inter-Gold to be a maker or obligor on the instrument.


Headnotes

[1] A party is not bound by a promissory note when the undisputed evidence establishes that the parties to the note did not intend to bind that party.

[2] A represented person is bound by a signature on an instrument if the signature is an authorized signature of the represented person, even if the represented person is not…

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Key Quotes

“If a person acting, or purporting to act, as a representative signs an instrument by signing either the name of the represented person or the name of the signer, the represented person is bound by the signature to the same extent the represented person would be bound if the signature were on a simple contract.”

Establishes the statutory framework for determining when a represented person is bound by an instrument signed by a representative

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Facts & Procedural History

Larry Moschini loaned money and obtained a promissory note signed by Pietro Moschini, individually and on behalf of Moschini Jewelry. Moschini's attor…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*775] PER CURIAM.

In this suit on a promissory note, the lender, Larry Moschini, appeals the trial court’s order granting a new trial after a jury verdict in his favor. In addition, Inter-Gold Italia, Inc., a party whom the lender claims is liable on the note and the only defendant remaining at trial, appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and other motions. We reverse the denial of Inter-Gold’s motion for directed verdict because the undisputed evidence establishes that the parties to the promissory note did not intend to bind Inter-Gold. This ruling renders moot the remaining issues on appeal.

The promissory note was signed by Pietro Moschini, individually and on behalf of Mos-chini Jewelry. Larry Moschini contended that, when Pietro Moschini signed the note on behalf of Moschini Jewelry, he also bound Inter-Gold which was holding itself out in the community as doing business as Moschini Jewelry. Larry IVfoschini’s claim against Inter-Gold is governed by section 673.4021(1), Florida Statutes (1993):

If a person acting, or purporting to act, as a representative signs an instrument by signing either the name of the represented person or the name of the signer, the represented person is bound by the signature to the same extent the represented person would be bound if the signature were on a simple contract. If the represented person is bound, the signature of the representative is the “authorized signature of the represented person” and the represented person is liable on the instrument, whether or not identified in the instrument.

There is no indication on the note that it is an obligation of Inter-Gold or that Pietro Moschini signed it in a representative capacity. Furthermore, Larry Moschini admitted that the first draft of the promissory note, which was prepared by his attorney, included Inter-Gold as a signatory and that Pietro Moschini refused to sign the note until Inter-Gold was deleted from the instrument. Pie-tro Moschini told Larry Moschini that he could not and would not sign the note for Inter-Gold. Larry Moschini’s attorney deleted Inter-Gold as an obligor on the instrument and Pietro Moschini then signed the note. These uncontroverted facts require the conclusion that Inter-Gold was not, and was never intended to be, a maker or obligor of the note. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to deny Inter-Gold’s motion for directed verdict.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that Inter-Gold’s motion for directed verdict be granted.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Jackson Cnty. Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    …ee the evidence.” We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of JH. Our reversal renders JH’s argument that the trial court erred in not granting its motion for new trial moot. See Moschini v. Inter-Gold Italia, Inc., 694 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA1997). B. Causation While we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of JH based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to prove reckless disregard, we also agree with JH that appellees presented insufficient evidence at…
  • Rosl, Inc. v. Jardins, 756 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …nt of the obligations of the lessee). Where a third-party does not sign the note, however, and the signatory does not sign in representative capacity of the third-party, the third-party is not liable on the note. Moschini v. Inter-Gold Italia, Inc., 694 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Here, the record shows that the promissory note contained language stating that “the undersigned joint and severally” promises pay off the debt. It also shows that La Londe signed the note, as president of ROSL; he did not s…

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