JOHN F. GAYTON, APPELLANT,
v.
MILLS SEPTIC TANK AND PCA SOLUTIONS, INC., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1997-05-02
No. 96-2422
ERVIN, DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur.
695 So. 2d 397 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

In a workers' compensation case, the judge of compensation claims denied benefits to Gayton based on insufficient evidence that his employer had any employees, despite a pretrial stipulation that the company had workers' compensation insurance. The appellate court reversed, holding that the judge should have allowed a post-hearing deposition into evidence to cure a notice defect.


Holding

The court reversed and remanded for further findings on whether Gayton should be deemed a statutory employee. The judge should have allowed the deposition into evidence to cure the notice defect because the pretrial stipulation regarding insurance coverage and the omission of any notice that the number of employees was disputed deprived the claimant of fair notice.


Headnotes

[1] A judge of compensation claims should notify parties of a lack of proof on an essential point and afford them an opportunity to submit evidence to cure it before entering…

[2] A company in the construction business is required to secure workers' compensation benefits for its employees if it employs even one non-exempt person.

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Key Quotes

“Because the company was in the construction business, it was required to secure workers' compensation benefits for its employees, if even one (non-exempt) person worked for it.”

Establishes the statutory requirement that construction companies must have workers' compensation coverage if they have even one employee

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Facts & Procedural History

Gayton claimed to be a statutory employee of Mills Septic Tank, Inc. and PCA Solutions, Inc., a construction company. The parties stipulated before th…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Proceedings below having been bifurcated, the parties stipulated that the issue to be tried before the judge of compensation claims at an evidentiary hearing was whether John F. Gayton was, as he contended, a statutory employee rather than, as contended by Mills Septic Tank, Inc., and PCA Solutions, Inc., an independent contractor. Some four months after the hearing concluded, the judge of compensation claims advised the parties by letter that he had decided that the claimant had failed to show that Mills Septic Tank, Inc., was obligated to have workers’ compensation coverage, because the evidence did not establish how many employees the company had. On this basis, the judge of compensation claims found it unnecessary to rule on any other question.

Because the company was in the construction business, it was required to secure workers’ compensation benefits for its employees, if even one (non-exempt) person worked for it. § 440.02(15)(b)(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). Before the hearing began, the parties had stipulated that the company had workers’ compensation insurance coverage.

Learning that whether the company needed insurance coverage was nevertheless perceived to be an issue, the claimant’s counsel scheduled a deposition at which he elicited the number of employees that worked for Mills Septic Tank, Inc. The judge of compensation claims refused to consider the deposition transcript, however, and ruled that he was unable to infer from the evidence adduced at the hearing that the company had even a single employee. On that ground, more than a year after the hearing, he entered the order denying relief which is now on appeal.

We reverse and remand for further findings and a determination as to whether the claimant should be deemed a statutory employee. See Orlando Sentinel v. Wong-Chow, 652 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

[I]n a case such as this where the record of the hearings does not contain the required evidence on an essential point, or points, the better procedure would be for the deputy, when he discovers the defect, to notify the parties of the lack of proof and afford them an opportunity to submit evidence to cure it before he enters his order. Tolbert v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 148 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla.1963). On the other hand, judges of compensation claims have much discretion in deciding whether to reopen a hearing record to receive new evidence after a final hearing has been held.

Ordinarily the need for finality and the importance of efficiency will outweigh the benefits of obtaining more evidence. But parties are entitled to notice of what is to be litigated. Here the parties’ pretrial stipulation that the company actually had workers’ compensation insurance coverage, and the omission in the pretrial stipulation of any suggestion that whether the company was legally required to obtain coverage was at issue at the hearing, deprived claimant of notice that the number of employees was disputed. The judge of compensation claims should have allowed the late deposition in evidence, in order to cure the notice problem.

Reversed and remanded.

ERVIN, DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Williams v. BCI Indus. & Alternative Serv. Concepts, 943 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …rs, claimant contends the JCC erred by denying the motion. Our standard of review of an order denying a motion to reopen the evi [*913] dence for the purpose of receiving new evidence is that of abuse of discretion. See Gayton v. Mills Septic Tank, 695 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Claimant fails to show the JCC abused his discretion by denying the motion. It is undisputed that a JCC may order an IME on his or her own motion. See, e.g., Scotty’s, Inc. v. Sarandrea, 645 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Berry…
  • Vargas v. Chamsy Transfer, Inc., 999 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    …otice and an opportunity to be heard. See Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). A corollary to this basic principle is that parties are entitled to notice of what is to be litigated. See Gayton v. Mills Septic Tank, 695 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The facts here are similar to those this court addressed in Isaac. There, we held it “was contrary to the procedural due process established for workers’ compensation cases for the [E/C] to seek to amend the pre-trial stip…

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