GEORGE B. CRIDLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., SECRETARY, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed denial of habeas corpus/mandamus petition, holding that retroactive application of a statute disqualifying prisoner from provisional credits violates ex post facto protections under Lynce v. Mathis.
Retroactive application of a statute disqualifying a prisoner from provisional credits and administrative gain-time violates ex post facto protections.
[1] Retroactive application of a statute eliminating provisional credits and administrative gain-time for a prisoner already released on such credits violates the Ex Post Fac…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“these early release mechanisms may be legislatively abolished without violating ex post facto protections”
Department's reliance on prior authority, which was later repudiated by Lynce v. Mathis
Cridland was awarded administrative gain-time and provisional credits while imprisoned, leading to his release. The Department of Corrections later de…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges the denial of a petition by which he alternatively sought a writ of mandamus or habeas corpus. While imprisoned the appellant was awarded administrative gain-time and provisional credits, which led to his release. However, the Department of Corrections (the department) subsequently determined that section 944.277(l)(i), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992), should have been applied so as to disqualify the appellant from receiving provisional credits. The appellant was thereafter returned to prison, whereupon all provisional credits and administrative gain-time were apparently cancelled pursuant to section 944.277(l)(i), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992), and section 944.278, Fla. Stat. (1995). The appellant claims that this is an unconstitutional ex post facto application of these statutes.
In responding to this claim the department relied on Attorney General Opinion 92-96 and eases such as Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1994), for the proposition that these early release mechanisms may be legislatively abolished without violating ex post facto protections. However, after the lower court denied relief the United States Supreme Court addressed a similar claim in Lynce v. Mathis, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997), and repudiated the broad import of these authorities. The appealed order is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for reconsideration or further proceedings in light of Lynce.
WEBSTER and MICKLE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Robinson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…Mathis, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). We accordingly reverse the order under review and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of the petition in light of Lynce. See Gridland v. Singletary, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1109, 695 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). ALLEN, WEBSTER and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997)
- Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994)