CHARLES L. KIRBY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-06-20
No. 95-03568
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
695 So. 2d 889 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 21 cases

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Synopsis

Charles Kirby appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, challenging the costs and attorney's fees imposed at sentencing. The court affirmed the conviction but reversed and remanded regarding the financial penalties, finding the trial court failed to cite proper statutory authority and provide required procedural safeguards.


Holding

The court affirmed the conviction but reversed the imposition of costs and attorney's fees. The $255 in costs and $300 in attorney's fees must be stricken because the trial court failed to cite statutory authority in the written order, failed to individually announce the discretionary costs, and failed to advise Kirby of his right to contest the attorney's fee.


Headnotes

[1] A written order imposing costs must cite the statutory authority for all costs, whether mandatory or discretionary.

[2] A trial court errs by failing to individually announce a discretionary cost, cite its statutory authority, and set forth the proper statutory authority in the written ord…

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Key Quotes

“The statutory authority for all costs imposed, whether they are mandatory or discretionary, must be cited in the written order.”

Establishes the core procedural requirement that trial courts must cite statutory authority in written sentencing orders for all costs.

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Facts & Procedural History

Kirby pled nolo contendere to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after reserving the right to appeal denial of a motion to suppress. At sent…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Charles L. Kirby, challenges the judgment and sentence imposed upon him after he was adjudicated guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We find that the trial court erred by requiring the appellant to pay certain costs and attorney’s fees, but affirm the court in all other respects.

The appellant, after reserving the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress certain evidence, pled nolo contendere to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the appellant’s sentencing hearing, the court orally ordered the appellant to pay $255 in court costs and $300 in attorney’s fees. The oral pronouncement, and the subsequent written order, did not refer to the statutory authority for these amounts. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence imposed upon him.

After appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and In re Appellate Court Response to Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla.1991), the appellant filed a pro se brief. The appellant, in addition to raising points which do not require further discussion, properly challenged the court costs and attorney’s fees assessed against him.

Since $253 of the $255 costs assessed in this matter were mandatory court costs, the trial court was not required to orally announce the dollar amount nor cite the statutory authority for the imposition of these costs. Lewis v. State, 671 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). These costs must be stricken, however, because the trial court in its written order did not set forth the statutory authority for their imposition. The statutory authority for all costs imposed, whether they are mandatory or discretionary, must be cited in the written order. Smith v. State, 686 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Belton v. State, 673 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Reyes, 655 So. 2d at 119. The remaining $2 was a discretionary cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1995). The court erred by failing to individually announce the $2 cost, failing to cite the statutory authority for its imposition, and by not setting forth the proper statutory authority in its written order. Taylor v. State, 664 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Reyes, 655 So. 2d at 116. Therefore, it must be stricken.

The $300 attorney’s fee must also be stricken. Although the trial court announced the amount at appellant’s sentencing hearing, it did not announce the statutory authority for its imposition and did not properly advise the appellant of his right to a hearing to contest this amount. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.720(d)(1); Washington v. State, 685 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

We, accordingly, strike attorney’s fees and costs. Upon remand the state may seek reimposition of both items. Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Carter v. State, 173 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    …which we remand for the trial court to correct. First, the trial court imposed two costs without appropriately citing the statutory authority for the costs in the order: a $20 “Teen Court” fee and a $20.50 “Pub. Rec. Mod.” fee. See Kirby v. State, 695 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Smith v. State, 686 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). We strike both costs and remand; on remand, the trial court may re-impose those costs in the appropriate amounts if it provides statutory authority for their assessmen…
  • Vick v. State, 37 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
    …ule on the motion within 60 days; thus, it is deemed denied. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B), (b)(1)(B). “The statutory authority for all costs imposed, whether they are mandatory or discretionary, must be cited in the written order.” Kirby v. State, 695 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Therefore, we strike the $664 in unidentified costs. On remand, the trial court may reimpose these costs if it provides statutory authority for their assessment. Vick also argues that the trial court erred in orally imposin…
  • Hornstra v. State, 218 So. 3d 979 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
    …sts of incarceration. Hornstra alleged, inter alia, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not challenging the trial court’s failure to cite any statutory authority for the imposition of costs in its written order. See Kirby v. State, 695 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“The statutory authority for all costs imposed, whether they are mandatory or discretionary, must be cited in the written order.” (citations omitted)). It is unclear how Hornstra could have more specifically identified the c…

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