THE ARIES INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ONELIA MARIA ALEMAN, APPELLEE
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Aries Insurance Company appealed a partial summary judgment on liability in favor of insurance policyholder Onelia Aleman. The court affirmed, holding that Florida Statutes section 627.7282 unambiguously requires an insurer to cancel a policy on the specific cancellation date stated in the required three-option notice letter, and that Aries violated this requirement by canceling on a different date.
The statute contains unambiguous language requiring the insurer to list a specific cancellation date in the three-option notice and to terminate the policy on that designated date, with a refund of any unearned premium. Aries violated this requirement by canceling on July 2 instead of the June 10 date stated in the notice.
[1] An insurance policy cancellation notice must specify a cancellation date, and termination must occur on that designated date.
[2] An insurer must refund any unearned premium when a policy is canceled.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an absurd result will be reached if the statute is interpreted to require the listing of a specific cancellation date, yet also allow for cancellation on some other, unspecified date”
The court's reasoning for why the statute must require cancellation on the stated date, not a different date
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAleman paid $1,042 for annual automobile insurance but received a premium invoice requiring an additional $216.48. The invoice gave her three options:…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
The Aries Insurance Company, defendant below, appeals from a non-final order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of Onelia Aleman, plaintiff below. We have jurisdiction, Fla.R.App.P. 9.1S0(a)(3)(C)(iv), and affirm.
Aleman paid Aries $1,042.00 for automobile insurance for one year, but then received a “premium invoice” informing her that an additional $216.48 was due. This invoice, known as a “three option letter,” gave Ale-man three choices: pay the additional premium; request cancellation of the policy; or take no action and have the policy canceled on the specific date of June 10, 1993. Ale- man chose the third option and did nothing. However, on June 18, 1993, Aries sent Ale-man a “notice of cancellation or nonrenewal” which informed her that the insurance was being canceled effective July 2, 1998. Ale-man was charged for the interim period of June 10 to July 2, at the higher rate, and subsequently filed suit, seeking declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract. The trial court found that section 627.7282, Florida Statutes (1993), contained unambiguous language requiring a letter that outlines the three options available in the statute and includes a cancellation date. The court interpreted the language to require a stated cancellation date, termination on that designated date, and a refund of any unearned premium.
The trial court correctly entered partial summary judgment for Aleman. As noted by that court, an absurd result will be reached if the statute is interpreted to require the listing of a specific cancellation date, yet also allow for cancellation on some other, unspecified date. See Savona v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 648 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla.1995)(“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, as is the case here, the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”); City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla.1993)(“It is well settled that where a statute is clear and unambiguous, as it is here, a court will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent.”); In re McCollam, 612 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla.1993)(stating that the court “will not go behind the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute unless an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion would result from a failure to do so”).
Affirmed.
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Union Am. Ins. Co. v. Onelia Rodriguez, 696 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…ez died on July 10, 1996; Onelia Rodriguez, personal representative of his estate, is the substitute parly. . The notice provided to Rodriguez was the same type of "three option letter” provided to Onelia Maria Aleman. See Aries Ins. Co. v. Aleman, 695 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).…
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Stinson v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 734 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…624.155 requires the 60-day written notice. The plaintiffs asserted that they had a cause of action for United Auto’s violation of section 627.7282 and that this Court .had already implicitly accepted their position in Aries Insurance Co. v. Aleman, 695 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) and Union American Insurance Co. v. Rodriguez, 696 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review dismissed, 717 So. 2d 541 (Fla.1998). Further, the plaintiffs argued [*507] that they had a contractual cause of action based on the insuran…
Authorities Cited
- City OF Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1993)
- In re McCOLLAM v. McCOLLAM, 612 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1993)
- Savona v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 648 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1995)