W.I., A CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A juvenile petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to disqualify a judge who had previously prosecuted him in an unrelated juvenile case and had disclosed a friendship with a case worker assigned to the petitioner. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the petition, finding sufficient grounds for disqualification based on the prior prosecution relationship, which created a well-founded fear that the juvenile would not receive a fair trial.
The court granted the petition for prohibition, finding sufficient grounds for disqualification based solely on the first claim—that the judge's prior prosecution of petitioner created a well-founded fear that petitioner would not receive a fair trial. The court found the second ground (disclosure of friendship with case worker) was not independently sufficient for disqualification under the applicable judicial conduct rules.
[1] A prior prosecution of a juvenile by a judge, even if unrelated to the current charges, can support a well-founded fear that the juvenile will not receive a fair trial.
[2] A motion to disqualify a judge is legally sufficient if it alleges grounds that, if true, would create a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair trial.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the fact that the presiding judge prosecuted petitioner in a previous case does not present a direct conflict of interest, it does support petitioner's claim of a well founded fear that he will not receive a fair trial before this judge.”
Establishes the standard for disqualification based on prior prosecutorial relationship—no direct conflict needed, only a well-founded fear of unfairness.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial judge presiding over petitioner W.I.'s juvenile prosecution had previously served as the prosecuting attorney in an unrelated 1995 juvenile …
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, W.I., a juvenile, seeks prohibition following the denial of his motion to disqualify the judge presiding in his prosecution. The motion to disqualify contained allegations that the presiding judge had been the prosecuting attorney assigned to a 1995 prosecution of petitioner as a juvenile (unrelated to this prosecution) and that the judge made an oral disclosure in open court, prior to the date charges were filed against petitioner in this case, advising counsel that she was close friends with a case worker assigned to petitioner. The trial judge denied the motion as legally insufficient.
First of all, we find that the motion was timely filed and that any technical deficiency as argued by respondent should not bar this otherwise legally sufficient claim for disqualification. Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Next, on the substantive grounds asserted in the motion for disqualification, we find sufficient grounds for relief on the first claim asserted alone. While the fact that the presiding judge prosecuted petitioner in a previous case does not present a direct conflict of interest, it does support petitioner’s claim of a well founded fear that he will not receive a fair trial before this judge. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla.1986); Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.160(d); section 38.10, Fla. Stat. (1995). Cf. Duest v. Goldstein, 654 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
We do not believe that the second ground asserted for disqualification, namely the trial judge’s voluntary disclosure of friendship with the case worker was legally sufficient in and of itself. Petitioner cited this court’s decision in Pool Water Products, Inc. v. Pools by L.S. Rule, 612 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), where this court held that a trial judge should have recused himself after revealing that he had a close family relationship with the president of one of the parties before him. This court said that if a judge reveals matters to the parties and gives them an opportunity to make a motion for disqualification, then the judge must re-cuse himself or herself on request of the parties which the judge invited. Pool Water Products may be distinguishable because the judge in that case made the voluntary disclosure and then gave the parties the opportunity to move to disqualify. Here, the judge simply made the disclosure. She did not invite a motion to disqualify.
After that decision, in In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 659 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1995), the Supreme Court of Florida amended its Commentary to Canon 3(E) as follows:
Canon 3E(1). Under this rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific rules in Section 3E(1) apply....
A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. The fact that the judge conveys this information does not automatically require the judge to be disqualified upon a request by either party, but the issue should be resolved on a ease-by-ease basis.
This Commentary casts some doubt on our decision in Pool Water Products to the extent that it could be read to require disqualification based solely on a judge’s voluntary disclosures.
Since we find a sufficient basis for disqualification based on the first ground asserted in the motion, however, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition. We withhold issuance of the writ, trusting that the judge will recuse herself from further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
DELL, GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Goines v. State, 708 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…e held that the facts underlying the well-grounded fear must be judged from the perspective of the moving party. We have only recently granted prohibition to disqualify a trial judge under the identical ground raised in this case. In W.I. v. State, 696 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the trial judge had previously prosecuted the same defendant, although more recently than in the present ease. In finding this ground sufficient to require disqualification, we said: “While the fact that the presiding judge pro…
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Cousins Rest. Assocs., L.P. v. TGI Friday's Inc., 789 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…e final judgment we stated that, because the judge revealed the matter, he was duty bound to recuse if one of the parties requested it. The panel recognized that this reasoning “may pose a dilemma for the trial bench.” Id. at 707. In W.I. v. State, 696 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), this court questioned the reasoning in Pool Water Products in light of In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 659 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1995), in which the Florida Supreme Court amended the Commentary to Canon 3(E) as follows: A judge shoul…
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Stevens v. Americana Healthcare Corp. OF Naples, 919 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…We do not believe that the trial judge’s voluntary disclosure of his friendship or acquaintance with some of the witnesses who might testify at trial in this matter was sufficient by itself to require the judge’s disqualification. See W.I. v. State, 696 So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that trial judge’s voluntary disclosure of friendship with juvenile defendant’s caseworker was not sufficient to require disqualification). But the trial judge’s remarks in this case did not end with his voluntary d…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Anne Marie Fischer v. Honorable Francis X. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1986)
- Caleffe v. Judge Linda L. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Duest v. Hon. Barry E. Goldstein, 654 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Pool Water Prods., Inc. v. Pools BY L.S. Rule, 612 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Hussein Altingeyik v. State, 659 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1995)
- In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 659 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1995)