LEON SALZVERG, PETITIONER,
v.
GENIE SALZVERG, RESPONDENT
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
This appeal by the now ex-husband from a “bifurcated” order which simply dissolved the parties’ marriage is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), review denied, 562 So. 2d 346 (Fla.1990); see Miami Columbus, Inc. v. Ramlawi, 687 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and cases cited. Upon the exercise of our discretionary authority to treat the proceeding as a petition for certiorari, the application is denied because the order plainly did not depart from the essential requirements of the law, § 61.052(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); Tunderman v. Lee, 585 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); see Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla.l980)(“split procedure should be used only when it is clearly necessary for the best interests of the parties or their children”), and because there has been no demonstration of even cognizable, let alone the required irreparable, harm. Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), review denied, 640 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1994); Tunderman, 585 So. 2d at 354. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995).
Certiorari denied.
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Citator
Cited By
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Nilda Casabona v. SCI Funeral Servs. OF Fla., Inc., 802 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ffect other than the exclusion of evidence relating only to the appellant’s co-plaintiffs. That ruling, in turn, was both unobjected to below, see Diaz v. Rodriguez, 384 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and entirely harmless. See Salzverg v. Salzverg, 696 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Dessanti v. Contreras, 695 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), review denied, 703 So. 2d 475 (Fla.1997); 3 Fla. Jur.2d Appellate Review §§ 299,383 (1997). Affirmed.…
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Briois v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. & Lett Garcia, 807 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ell be that a bifurcation order in itself — like one as to how long to break for lunch during trial — is entirely discretionary and thus essentially unreviewable,2 we cannot reverse on this ground. Casabona, 802 So. 2d at 1151; Salzverg v. Salzverg, 696 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2001)(harmless error). Affirmed. . Indeed, the primary subcomplaint, that the issues were determined by essentially the same jury sitting in mini trials held several months apart, does not even present…
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Authorities Cited
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1995)
- Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1980)
- Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Miami Columbus, Inc. v. Zahid A. Ramlawi, 687 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Tunderman v. Young Ja LEE, 585 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)