LARRY CECIL SINGLETON, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICIA KAY SINGLETON, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a family law judgment finding that the trial court failed to provide required statutory findings for equitable property distribution and permanent alimony, and improperly included the husband's girlfriend's income when calculating child support guidelines.
The trial court failed to comply with section 61.075(3) and 61.08(1) by not listing marital assets, providing individual valuations, and making required findings for alimony. Additionally, the trial court improperly included the girlfriend's income in the child support calculation because nothing in the record demonstrated that she made contributions to reduce the husband's living expenses as required by section 61.30(2)(a)13.
[1] A final judgment distributing marital assets must list the assets to be distributed, include an individual valuation of significant assets, and identify the assets awarde…
[2] The propriety of permanent alimony cannot be evaluated without findings of fact required by statute.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Contrary to section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes (1995), the final judgment in this case did not list the marital assets to be distributed, failed to include an 'individual valuation of significant assets,' and neglected to identify the assets awarded to the husband, other than to state that he was to receive 'all other marital property.'”
Establishes the trial court's failure to comply with statutory requirements for property distribution findings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce case, the trial court entered a final judgment distributing marital property and awarding permanent alimony and child support. The judgme…
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PER CURIAM.
Contrary to section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes (1995), the final judgment in this case did not list the marital assets to be distributed, failed to include an “individual valuation of significant assets,” and neglected to identify the assets awarded to the husband, other than to state that he was to receive “all other marital property.” With out specific findings as to the value of marital assets, meaningful appellate review of an equitable distribution of property is impossible. Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Similarly, the propriety of permanent alimony cannot be evaluated because the final judgment does not contain those findings of fact required by section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1995). See, e.g., Bomwell v. Bomwell, 676 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Finally, in setting guideline child support, the trial court included, without explanation, $2,466 per month of income attributable to the husband’s girlfriend, with whom he lived at the time of the final hearing. Section 61.30(2)(a)13, Florida Statutes (1995), pertaining to the child support guidelines, provides that gross income “shall include ... Reimbursed expenses or in Mnd payments ... to the extent that they reduce living expenses.” See Cooper v. Kahn, 696 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Long v. Long, 622 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); McCall v. McCall, 616 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Thalgott v. Thalgott, 571 So. 2d 1368, 1370 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Nothing in this record demonstrates that the girlfriend made any contributions to reduce the husband’s expenses such that his income should be increased for the purpose of computing his child support obligation.
The husband testified that he paid his girlfriend $700 towards their household expenses. To arrive at the $2,466 figure that was added to the husband’s employment income, the trial court apparently deducted the $700 amount, along with $241 in automobile expenses, from the $3,407 in total expenses listed on the husband’s financial affidavit. The financial affidavit included expenses that had nothing to do with the shared living arrangement, such as a $612 mortgage on the marital home, $888 in child support and $216 in insurance costs. There was no evidence at trial that the girlfriend did anything to reduce these expenses.
The husband argues that Sullivan v. Sullivan, 593 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), proscribes any use of his girlfriend’s contributions to their joint lifestyle to increase his income for the purpose of computing his child support obligation. Sullivan’s holding was more narrow; in the context of a civil contempt proceeding, we held that in determining the husband’s ability to pay a $3,250 purge amount, it was error to consider his roommate’s income. We did not address how the roommate’s contribution to the husband’s living expenses might be included as “income” for the purpose of computing a child support obligation under section 61.30.
We reverse the final judgment and remand to the trial court to make the findings of fact required by Chapter 61. Also, the trial court shall reconsider the child support award without including the girlfriend’s income, unless it finds that the girlfriend made contributions that reduced the husband’s living expenses.
FARMER, STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Shoffner v. Shoffner, 744 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…n 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Without specific written findings as to the value of marital assets and liabilities, meaningful appellate review of the equitable distribution of property is impossible. See, e.g., [*1158] Singleton v. Singleton, 696 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Written findings in the order are also required in regard to an award of permanent alimony. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 710 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Where a final judgment lacks findings of fact to support an award of…
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Lule v. Lule, 60 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ion scheme”); Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (reversing a final judgment because it awarded the husband’s interest in the marital home to the wife without providing a valuation of the marital home); Singleton v. Singleton, 696 So. 2d 1338, 1338-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (reversing a final judgment because, among other reasons, it did not comply with 61.075(3)). In the instant case, the trial court awarded the husband’s interest in the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony solely…
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Wertkin v. Wertkin, 763 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…of marital assets, it must make specific findings as to their value because “[wjithout specific findings as to the value of marital assets, meaningful appellate review of an equitable distribution of property is impossible.” Singleton v. Singleton, 696 So. 2d 1338, 1338-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(citing Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); see also Reich v. Reich, 652 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 623 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Thalgott v. Thalgott, 571 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Long v. Long, 622 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Manning v. State, 696 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- McCALL v. McCALL, 616 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Sullivan v. Sullivan, 593 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Sturdivan v. State, 676 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Bomwell v. Bomwell, 676 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)