DONALD LUBOWICKI, APPELLANT,
v.
OXFORD RESOURCES CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Lubowicki leased a car from Oxford Resources that was vandalized while in a repair shop. When Oxford sued for unpaid lease payments, Lubowicki claimed an accord and satisfaction agreement discharged the debt. The court reversed summary judgment because conflicting affidavits created a material factual dispute about whether the parties agreed to settle the claim.
The court held that conflicting affidavits regarding the existence of an accord and satisfaction agreement created a material issue of fact that precluded summary judgment, as accord and satisfaction is primarily a question of the parties' intention, which is itself a question of fact.
[1] Summary judgment is precluded when genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's affirmative defenses.
[2] An accord and satisfaction agreement, if proven, can nullify an original agreement between parties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to be entitled to summary judgment, the record must be clear that no material issues of fact remain as to either Oxford's claim or the affirmative defenses Appellant raised, including accord and satisfaction.”
Establishes the legal standard for summary judgment in this context
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLubowicki had a leased car in a repair shop for minor repairs. While the car was there, the parties renewed their automobile leasing agreement. The ca…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant argues that genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment against him. We agree and reverse.
Appellant had taken a car leased from Oxford Resources Corporation into a third-party repair shop for minor repairs. While the car was in the repair shop’s possession, the parties renewed an automobile leasing agreement between them. When Appellant learned that the car had been severely van dalized at the repair shop, he refused to take possession of the ear and faded to make lease payments to Oxford.
Oxford sued Appellant, alleging that Appellant owed it the lease payments under the lease agreement’s terms.- Appellant answered, alleging several affirmative defenses, including accord and satisfaction. When Oxford moved for summary judgment, it filed an affidavit alleging that at no time did it tell Appellant that it would “forego any sums due and owing under the second lease.” Appellant filed a counter affidavit, alleging that when he returned the car to Oxford, he entered into an agreement with Oxford’s agents “whereby in view of the condition of the vehicle and in that it was useless for the purposes for which it was leased and in consideration of redelivery of the vehicle” to Oxford, all of Oxford’s claims were satisfied. The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellant.
In order to be entitled to summary judgment, the record must be clear that no material issues of fact remain as to either Oxford’s claim or the affirmative defenses Appellant raised, including accord and satisfaction. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985). Appellant’s affidavit establishes that an accord and satisfaction agreement between the parties existed. Oxford’s affidavit disputes that the parties ever entered into an accord and-satisfaction agreement. This discrepancy is a material issue of fact, in that if proven, accord and satisfaction would nullify the parties’ original agreement. See, e.g., Chappell v. Nalle, 119 Fla. 711, 160 So. 867 (1935); see also State Road Dep’t v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 237 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). Because accord and satisfaction is primarily a question of the parties’ intention, which itself is a question of fact, summary judgment in light of this material issue was premature. See Cufferi v. Royal Palm Dev. Co., 516 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Langbein v. Comerford, 215 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STONE, C.J., and GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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ST. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Schocoff, 725 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…ffect settlement of their dispute by a superseding agreement. Intention is, as a rule, a question of fact. Best Concrete Corp. v. Oswalt Engineering Service Corp., 188 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); see also Lubowicki v. Oxford Resources Corp., 697 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“[A]ccord and satisfaction is primarily a question of the parties’ intention[s], ... which itself is a question of fact.”). On the factual issue of the parties’ intent to effect settlement, the insurer offered no evidence o…
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Authorities Cited
- Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985)
- Cufferi v. Royal Palm Dev. Co., Inc., 516 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Irwin L. Langbein v. Comerford, 215 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Chappell v. Peyton J. Watson, 119 Fla. 711 (Fla. 1935)
- State Rd. Dep't v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 237 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)