GEORGE SCHLOESSER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-07-30
No. 95-02813
FRANK, A.C.J., BLUE, J., and RYDER, HERBOTH S., Senior Judge, concur.
697 So. 2d 942 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Negative Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

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Synopsis

George Schloesser was convicted of multiple lewd acts and handling/fondling a child. The Florida appellate court affirmed his convictions but reversed his sentences because the trial court improperly applied a 1992 statutory amendment that allowed victim injury points in sexual abuse cases, when the evidence did not establish the crimes occurred after the statute's April 8, 1992 effective date.


Holding

The court affirmed the convictions but reversed the sentences because the trial court erred in scoring victim injury points for four counts under the 1992 amendment when the state failed to prove the offenses occurred after April 8, 1992. Under the rule of lenity, the harsher sentencing guidelines terms cannot be applied when the effective date is ambiguous.


Headnotes

[1] Victim injury points cannot be scored in sexual abuse cases absent a showing of physical injury or trauma, unless the offense occurred after the effective date of the sta…

[2] A statute permitting the addition of victim injury points in sexual abuse cases applies only to offenses committed on or after its effective date.

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Key Quotes

“sentencing guidelines points could not be scored for victim injury in sexual abuse cases absent a showing that the victim suffered physical injury or trauma as a result of the sexual abuse”

Established the pre-1992 law under Karchesky that victim injury points required proof of physical injury or trauma

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Facts & Procedural History

Schloesser was charged with capital sexual battery allegedly committed between August 1, 1989 and July 1, 1991, but was convicted of lesser-included o…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for committing one count of a lewd act upon a child under the age of sixteen, two counts of committing a lewd act in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen, and two counts of handling and fondling a child under the age of sixteen. We affirm his convictions without discussion, but reverse his sentences because the trial court erred in calculating victim injury points on the sentencing guidelines score sheet for four of his convictions.

In Karchesky v. State, 591 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1992), the supreme court held that sentencing guidelines points could not be scored for victim injury in sexual abuse cases absent a showing that the victim suffered physical injury or trauma as a result of the sexual abuse. In 1992 the legislature abrogated the holding in Karchesky by enacting section 921.001(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992) (now codified at section 921.0011(7), Florida Statutes (1995)), which permits the addition of victim injury points in sexual abuse cases where penetration or sexual contact is an element of the offense, regardless of whether physical injury or trauma occurred. Section 921.001(8) became effective on April 8, 1992.

Count one of the information filed in this case alleged that the defendant committed capital sexual battery on the child between August 1, 1989, and July 1, 1991. After hearing the evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of committing a lewd act in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen. Neither the information nor the state’s evidence proved that the offense was committed after April 8,1992, or that physical injury or trauma resulted from the defendant’s action. Accordingly, under the applicable law of Karchesky, the trial court erred in scoring points for victim injury on this count.

Counts two and three of the information alleged that those offenses occurred between July 1, 1991, and August 31, 1993. The handling and fondling offense charged in count four was alleged to have occurred between May 31, 1989, and August 31, 1993. At trial the victim testified that the defendant regularly sexually abused her over a period of years until she was thirteen or fourteen years old. She could not recall, however, how old she was when the acts began. Thus, the state failed to prove that any of the acts charged in these counts occurred after April 8,1992. As such, the rule of lenity requires that the harsher terms of section 921.001(8) not be applied when calculating the defendant’s sentencing guidelines scoresheet. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 574 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (applying rules of lenity and strict construction to resolve ambiguity in sentencing guidelines in favor of defendant); Gilbert v. State, 680 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (holding rule of lenity required applying guidelines that resulted in lesser sentence where neither information nor evidence established that crimes were committed after effective date of statute providing lesser sentencing range). Accordingly, in arriving at the defendant’s sentencing range, the trial court erred in calculating victim injury points for counts two through four. This error is not harmless because when these points are subtracted the defendant’s permitted sentencing range drops three cells.

Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing pursuant to a corrected score sheet. Because of this disposition, the defendant’s remaining issue on appeal is moot.

Convictions affirmed, sentences reversed, and cause remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

FRANK, A.C.J., BLUE, J., and RYDER, HERBOTH S., Senior Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cairl v. State, 833 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …in support of the proposition that when sentencing laws change during a period in which a defendant is alleged to have committed an offense, the defendant should be sentenced under the more lenient version of the guidelines. See Schloesser v. State, 697 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Duer v. Moore, 765 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Maitre v. State, 770 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Gilbert v. State, 680 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Each of these cases cites State v. Griffith, 675 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1996),…
  • Newman v. State, 738 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …de enhanced penalties.” See § 794.023(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). This would create an ambiguity which, under the rule of lenity, must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See § 775.021, Fla. Stat. (1997); Cabal, 678 So. 2d at 318; Schloesser v. State, 697 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 794.023 is a penalty enhancement statute, and that the trial court-erred by reclassifying Newman’s crimes to first degree felonies. Properly classified as second degre…
  • Dickson v. State, 826 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …te, 591 So. 2d 930 (Fla.1992); Lohret v. State, 687 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Removing these victim injury points decreases four of Dickson’s recommended sentences by two cells. This error cannot be considered harmless. See Schloesser v. State, 697 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The trial court made a point to note that Dickson made no contemporaneous objection to the victim injury points and did not raise the issue on appeal. However, this issue may be raised for the first time in a rule 3.800(a) motio…

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