DUKE H. SCOTT, M.D., PETITIONER,
v.
BRENDA D. NELSON, JOAN PUTNAM, AND SHERRY CLAY, RESPONDENTS
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Dr. Scott sought to prevent the deposition of Sara A. based on a confidentiality agreement in a prior settlement, arguing it would harm his reputation and livelihood. The court held that contractual confidentiality agreements cannot be used to interfere with discovery rights of non-parties to the contract, and denied the petition for certiorari.
The court held that a confidentiality agreement between two parties cannot be used to adversely interfere with the discovery rights of non-parties, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Sara A. to testify regarding factual matters underlying her claims against the petitioner.
[1] A contractual confidentiality agreement cannot be used to adversely interfere with the discovery rights of non-parties to the contract.
[2] Settlement agreements that suppress evidence violate public policy.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the contractual confidentiality agreement between Dr. Scott and Sara A. cannot be used to adversely interfere with the ability of respondents, non-parties to the contract, to pursue discovery in support of their case”
Establishes the core holding that confidentiality agreements do not bind non-parties to the contract.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDr. Scott settled a prior lawsuit with Sara A. and included a confidentiality clause prohibiting her from responding to inquiries about the case. When…
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WOLF, Judge.
In this ease, Dr. Duke Scott has petitioned this court for writ of certiorari to review an order denying petitioner’s motion for a protective order in regard to the respondents’ request to take the deposition of Sara A. A settlement agreement entered into between the petitioner and Sara A. in a prior cause of action contains a confidentiality agreement which prohibits Sara A. or her attorneys from responding “in any way to any inquiry of any kind whatsoever with regard to the facts surrounding the case/claim” against the petitioner. When the respondents sued the petitioner in a subsequent cause of action and attempted to depose Sara A., the petitioner interposed a motion for a protective order on the grounds that allowing Sara A. to be deposed would cause irreparable injury to his reputation and livelihood and deprive him of the protections for which he bargained in the settlement with Sara A. Following a hearing on the motion, an order was entered prohibiting testimony regarding the procedural aspects of the Sara A. case only, while allowing Sara A. to testify as to factual matters concerning the allegations in her lawsuit against the petitioner. Upon our review of the petition for writ of certiorari, we find that the contractual confidentiality agreement between Dr. Scott and Sara A. cannot be used to adversely interfere with the ability of respondents, non-parties to the contract, to pursue discovery in support of their case; therefore, we deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
A trial court possesses broad discretion in protecting the parties that come before it and in overseeing the discovery process. See Rojas v. Ryder Track Rental, Inc., 641 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla.1994). It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine matters relating to discovery, and such orders reviewed pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari will not be overturned absent departure from the essential requirements of law. See, e.g., North Florida Regional Hosp. v. Douglas, 454 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). While we recognize and respect strong public policy favoring settlement of disputed claims and policy which dictates that confidentiality agreements not be regarded lightly, we find that to prevent any discovery based upon a settlement agreement would result in a defendant being able to buy the silence of witnesses with a settlement agreement when the facts of one controversy may be relevant to another. See Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365-366 (D.Nev.1993). “While settlement is an important objective, an overzealous quest for alternative dispute resolution can distort the proper role of the court.... [Settlement agreements which suppress evidence violate the greater public policy.” Id. at 367 (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. Ill. L.Rev. 457, 502 & 504); see also McKnight v. Stein Mart, Inc., No.CIV.A.95-0258, 1996 WL 481079, at *1 (E.D.La. Aug. 22, 1996); Wendt v. Walden University, Inc., No.CIV.4-95-467, 1996 WL 84668, at *2 (D.Minn. Jan. 16, 1996).
The testimony sought from Sara A. in this case is potentially relevant. The respondents are not seeking information about the terms of the settlement agreement, rather they are seeking factual information underlying Sara A.’s claims against the petitioner which may be relevant and admissible in respondents’ cause of action. As such, the testimony is discoverable. We find that the order of the trial court does not depart from the essential requirements of law, and thus deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
JOANOS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 710 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…of time which elapsed in the case at bar.”2 See also Smith v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 564 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So. 2d 607, 610-611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), this court denied a physician’s petition for certiorari to overturn a trial court’s denial of a protective order. The protective order was sought to prohibit the plaintiffs from taking the deposition of a party who had settled a…
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Nestor v. Posner-Gerstenhaber, 857 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…ctual confidentiality agreements, however, cannot be used to adversely interfere with the ability of nonparties to pursue discovery in support of their case. See Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[S]ettlement agreements which suppress evidence violate the greater public policy.”). Informal ex parte interviews with former employees are allowed, see H.B.A. Mgmt., Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541, 544-45 (F…
Authorities Cited
- Rojas v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 641 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1994)
- N. Fla. Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. Douglas, 454 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)