LAUREN YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
PETER YOUNG, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a marital dissolution case, the Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's treatment of $1.9 million transferred to the husband from his father as nonmarital property, holding that assets acquired during marriage are presumed marital unless the spouse establishes a special equity. The court also reversed a geographic restriction on relocating the children as premature and unsupported by required findings.
Assets acquired during marriage are presumed marital under Florida law and the presumption is overcome only by establishing a special equity; the husband failed to establish a special equity in the $1.9 million and assets purchased with it, so they must be treated as marital assets. The geographic restriction on removing children from Dade County was reversed as premature (since neither party sought to relocate) and lacking required factual findings.
[1] Assets acquired during a marriage are presumed to be marital, and this presumption can only be overcome by a showing of special equity.
[2] A party claiming a special equity in funds or assets must establish that claim by substantial competent evidence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Marital assets include assets acquired "during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them ..." § 61.075(5)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (1995). Such assets are presumed to be marital; the presumption is overcome only upon a showing of a special equity.”
Establishes the statutory presumption that assets acquired during marriage are marital property unless a special equity is proven.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for seven years during which neither spouse earned income. The husband's father paid all living expenses for the couple and t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Presumption Of Marital Asset cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The former wife appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.
The parties were married for seven years; during that time neither the husband nor the wife earned any income. The husband’s father paid the living expenses of the couple and their two children. In addition, during the marriage the husband’s father transferred to the husband $1.9 million for services — the nature of which the record does not make clear — that the husband allegedly performed for his father before the couple married.
The trial court treated the $1.9 million as nonmarital funds, and the assets purchased with those funds as nonmarital assets. In so doing, the trial court erred. Marital assets include assets acquired “during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them ...” § 61.075(5)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (1995). Such assets are presumed to be marital; the presumption is overcome only upon a showing of a special equity. § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (1995). See Heinrich v. Heinrich, 609 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The husband failed to establish, by substantial competent evidence, a special equity in those funds and the assets acquired with them. Our opinion today requires the trial court, upon remand, to revisit all of its prior rulings regarding the distribution of property and the parties’ financial obligations to each other.1
Finally, we reverse that portion of the order that prohibits either party from removing the children from Dade County without prior court order or written agreement of the parties. The restriction is premature, as neither party has sought to relocate. Moreover, the trial court failed to make any of the findings required to support such a residential restriction. See Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1993). Upon remand, the trial court shall strike that provision.
We affirm the remaining portions of the order on appeal, including the award of child support, to which the parties agreed.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.
. We note that the portion of the trial court's order that imputes income to each party contains no factual findings, and the record contains no evidence to support that imputation of income.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Knoff v. Knoff, 751 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…llo, 707 So. 2d at 351. We agree with the Wife that the provision in the final judgment prohibiting her from relocating the children’s primary residence is improper because the parties did not plead or litigate that issue below. See Young v. Young, 698 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review denied, 707 So. 2d 1128 (Fla.1998). Accordingly, we strike that provision from the final judgment. The Wife also urges this court to strike that provision in the final judgment ordering her to undertake certain effor…
-
Leeds v. Adamse, 832 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…ody). The Third District Court of Appeal has held that it is improper to include in a final judgment a clause which prohibits either party from removing the children from the county absent one of the parties seeking to relocate. See Young v. Young, 698 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). We note that the clause in this case prohibits relocation and not the temporary removal of the children and is therefore less restrictive than the clause in Young. However, we believe that the absence of such a clause creates the…
-
Harris v. Joyner, 732 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…s final judgment indicates that neither of the parties has a present intention to move from the Leon County, Florida area. We find that resolution of this issue is controlled by the Third District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Young v. Young, 698 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1128 (Fla.1998), a case decided after the trial court ruled in this matter. Therein, the Third District Court of Appeal stated: [W]e reverse that portion of the order that prohibits either party from remo…
Authorities Cited
- Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993)
- Heinrich v. Heinrich, 609 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)