LARRY M. O'BRIEN AND LORI WISE O'BRIEN, APPELLANTS,
v.
SHEILA L. RUSSELL, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A party cannot accept an offer of judgment after a trial has commenced, even if within the statutory thirty-day period.
Plaintiff accepted a defendant's offer of judgment twelve days before trial, but after a defense verdict had been rendered. Plaintiff appealed the den…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Absurd Result Doctrine cases and more on FLexlaw
PER curiam;.
Larry O’Brien, the plaintiff in a personal injury ease, appeals from the denial of his motions to enforce the acceptance of an offer of judgment and for a new trial. We affirm.
Immediately following a defense verdict for Sheila Russell, O’Brien formally accepted Russell’s offer of judgment made twelve days before trial. O’Brien contends that section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), allows him a full thirty days to accept such an offer, trial notwithstanding. We reject such an interpretation. See Hanzelik v. Grottoli & Hudon Inv. of Am., Inc., 687 So. 2d 1363, 1366 (Fla. 4th DCA) (noting that statutes are not to be interpreted “so as to yield an absurd result” and that a party cannot accept an offer of judgment once the trial has commenced), review denied, 697 So. 2d 510 (Fla.1997); Braham v. Camcross, 514 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (explaining that to allow a party to accept an offer “contrary to the verdict rendered by the jury would totally defeat the ends of justice and allow a mockery of the judicial system”).
O’Brien’s other issue, that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, is without merit. See Liriano v. Gonzalez, 605 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“[Affirmative testimony regarding a mechanical failure will serve to rebut the negligence presumption.”).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Marie-Eve Kroener and Kent Kroener v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n (Figa) as successor in interest to Atl. Preferred Ins. Co., Inc., 63 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…eceived the offer prior to trial but waited until trial was essentially complete to attempt to accept it); Braham v. Carncross, 514 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (refusing to allow acceptance of offer after jury verdict rendered); O'Brien v. Russell, 698 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that because section 768.79, Florida Statutes, allows him a full thirty days to accept the defendant’s offer of judgment, he could, immediately after a defense verdict, accept the offer made twelv…
Authorities Cited
- Ulyses Liriano v. Gonzalez, 605 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Hanzelik v. Grottoli & Hudon Inv. OF Am., Inc., 687 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Murray Podhurst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Braham v. Carncross, 514 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)