MICHAEL CRUDELE, APPELLANT,
v.
BILL NELSON, AS TREASURER AND INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, APPELLEE
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Appellant Michael Crudele appeals an emergency order suspending his insurance agent licenses based on transactions with a client involving corporate promissory notes. The court holds that the emergency order lacks the particularized facts necessary to demonstrate immediate danger to public health, safety, and welfare, and reverses the suspension.
An emergency order must specify facts and reasons for finding immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare, and every element necessary to the order's vitality must appear on its face. General conclusory predictions of harm are insufficient. Here, the emergency order failed to meet this standard because it did not identify particularized facts demonstrating immediate danger and contained no findings of continuing conduct or Crudele's complicity.
[1] An agency issuing an emergency order must specify particularized facts demonstrating an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for conc…
[2] Every element necessary to the vitality of an emergency order must appear on its face.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When issuing an emergency order, an agency must specify the "facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances."”
Establishes the statutory requirement for emergency orders under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCrudele, a licensed insurance agent, engaged in three transactions with client Mary Clem in late 1993 and early 1994 involving the sale of corporate p…
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KAHN, Judge.
Appellant, Michael Crudele, appeals an emergency order entered by the appellee Insurance Commissioner that suspended all insurance agent licenses in Crudele’s name. The order relates three transactions involving Crudele and his client, Mary Clem. These transactions took place in late 1993 and early 1994, and generally involved the sale by Cru-dele to Clem of certain corporate promissory notes. Appellant argues that the emergency order of suspension does not set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing. We agree.
When issuing an emergency order, an agency must specify the “facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances.” § 120.54(4)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). “Every element necessary to the order’s vitality must appear on its face.” Commercial Consultants Corp. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
The reviewing court will not accept a general conclusory prediction of harm as support for an emergency order. Id. The reviewing court must determine whether the emergency order “sufficiently identif[ies] particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public.” Witmer v. Department of Bus. & Prof. Reg., 631 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
In the present case, the emergency order discloses a series of related transactions between the licensed agent and one client, each having occurred well over two years before the issuance of the emergency order of suspension. The Commissioner sets forth no factual findings of a continuing pattern of conduct that must be stopped in order to prevent further harm to the public. No allegations or findings in the order suggest anything in Crudele’s history as a licensed agent that would support an inference of such continuing conduct. Importantly, the alleged loss to Clem occurred when the corporate maker failed to honor its promissory notes. The Commissioner has not alleged Crudele’s complicity in the actions of the corporation, or that he had any prior knowledge that the corporation would fail to honor its obligations. The type of conduct alleged, therefore, is perhaps appropriate for an administrative complaint where appellant can present evidence and the Department can formulate a final order based upon all such evidence. Under Witmer, however, this case is not appropriate for an emergency suspension without notice and an opportunity for the licensee to present evidence.
REVERSED.
DAVIS and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Showntail the Legend, LLC v. State of Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…able danger immediately flowing from the stay. There must be “sufficiently identif[ied] particularized facts” from which we can determine a probable danger, and the burden rests with the agency to document those specific facts. Crudele v. Nelson, 698 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (quoting Witmer v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Fla. Dep’t of Ins., 646 So. 2d 784, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (rejecting “conclusory findings” that are…
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Bio-Med Plus, Inc. v. State, 915 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…racketeering, conspiracy, and fraud offenses involving actions from 1999 to 2003, those offenses or any other actions in violation of chapter 499 are continuing or now present an immediate serious danger to the public health. See Crudele v. Nelson, 698 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(reversing ESO which was based upon conduct that had occurred “well over two years before the issuance of the [ESO] ” and there were “[n]o allegations or findings in the order ... that would support an inference of such conti…
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Steven L. Kaplan, M.D. v. State, 45 So. 3d 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…rof'l Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The reviewing court must focus not simply on charges of statutory violations, but instead, upon “particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public.” Crudele v. Nelson, 698 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The factual allegations of [*21] a legally sufficient emergency suspension order must demonstrate: (1) the complained of conduct is likely to continue; (2) the order is necessary to stop the emergency; and (3) the order is…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Commercial Consultants Corp. & Linene Woods, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Witmer v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)