WILLIAM W. FLOURNOY ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
J. D. SMITH, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a foreclosure decree regarding attorney fees, holding that fees cannot be awarded based solely on the mortgagee's counsel's opinion testimony. The court established that reasonable attorney fees in foreclosure proceedings must be determined by competent, disinterested testimony and the chancellor's careful discretion, considering the complexity and nature of the work performed.
A trial court may not award attorney fees in foreclosure proceedings based solely on the opinion of the mortgagee's counsel. The court must hear testimony from competent and disinterested attorneys regarding the value of services rendered, and the chancellor must exercise careful discretion to ensure only reasonable fees are allowed, considering the complexity and nature of the foreclosure work.
“While in this State testimony should be taken upon which reasonable attorney fees may be allowed against the mortgagor in foreclosure proceedings, and while counsel for the mortgagee may not be an incompetent witness as to the value of the attorney's services in the case, yet the ascertainment of reasonable attorney fees for the services of complainant's counsel in foreclosing the mortgage involves a principal of ethics and it is not good practice to award such fees predicated only on the opinion of complainant's counsel”
Establishes that while mortgagee's counsel may testify about fee value, fees cannot be awarded based solely on that counsel's opinion due to ethical concerns.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMortgagors defaulted on two promissory notes secured by a mortgage containing an attorney's fees clause. In foreclosure proceedings, counsel for the m…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Attorney'S Fees In Foreclosure cases and more on FLexlaw
Per Curiam.
This appeal was taken from decrees in foreclosure proceedings. The mortgage provided for its foreclosure if any default be made and for “attorney’s fees” for foreclosure. Among others the following interrogatory was addressed to one of the counsel for the complainants : ‘ ‘ Please state any other matter or thing within your knowledge that may be of benefit to either party?” To this “interrogatory, witness saith: My opinion is the defendant is liable for the $2,000.00 note, principal and interest, and the $4,000.00 note less unearned interest at the date of the decree, and that the complainant is entitled to his cost and attorney’s fees in taking these measures to protect himself, and that a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees would be ten per cent, of the principal and interest actually due, plus $25.00 filing cost.” No other testimony was taken as to the value of the attorney fees allowed. The decree awarded attorney fees to the amount of ten per cent of the amount found to be due on the indebtedness. While in this State testimony should be taken upon which reasonable attorney fees may be allowed against the mortgagor in foreclosure proceedings, and while counsel for the mortgagee may not be an incompetent witness as to the value of the attorney’s services in the case, yet the ascertainment of reasonable attorney fees for the services of complainant’s counsel in foreclosing the mortgage involves a principal of ethics and it is not good practice to award such fees predicated only on the opinion of complainant’s counsel as is quoted above.
In obtaining decrees for large amounts ten per cent of the amount decreed may not be reasonable particularly in merely formal foreclosures where no unusual skill or labor is required. A large discretion is vested in the chancellor and he should take care that only reasonable attorney fees be allowed upon a consideration of testimony on the subject by competent and disinterested attorneys, reserving in all cases the right and duty of the chancellor to determine the reasonableness qf th© award to be made considering all the pertinent circumstances thát should legally and equitably affect the amount allowed, to the end that mortgagors be not unreasonably penalized.
The decree is reversed as to the attorney fees allowed and the cause is remanded for appropriate procedure.
Browne, C. J., and Taylor, Whitfield, Ellis and West, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
The R. E. L. McCaskill Co. v. Dekle, 88 Fla. 285 (Fla. 1924)…is not conclusive and that a large discretion rests in the court, who should take care that a reasonable charge only, under all the pertinent circumstances of the case, be allowed. Evors v. Bryan, 77 Fla. 399, 81 South. Rep. 513; Flournoy v. Smith, 84 Fla. 553, 94 South. Rep. 503. It is a matter of common knowledge, within judicial cognizance, that land values in the locality or section in which the property is involved in this litigation is located were much higher at the time of the contract of sale in…
-
Jaudon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 102 Fla. 782 (Fla. 1931)…eld that' ‘ ‘ Counsel for complainant is an improper witness to testify as to the reasonableness of fees to be charged by him for services rendered to complainant in a pending suit.” Kennedy v. Kennedy, 101 Fla. 239, 134 So. 201; Flournoy v. Smith, 84 Fla. 553, 94 So. 503. It will be noted that the above principle of law has reference to testimony as to the “reasonableness” of fee and not as to “agreement” to pay a reasonable fee. Appellant contends that under the decision of Brett v. First National Ban…
-
Bart M. Behar v. Root, 393 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…her former husband under the doctrine of frustration of purpose. 11 Fla.Jur.2d Contracts §§ 211, 212. If the trial court was of the view that Behar’s testimony, standing alone, was insufficient to support the award, Flournoy v. Smith, 84 Fla. 553, 94 So. 503 (1922); Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1964), it was nonetheless in error. At trial, the agreement between Behar and his former client was properly admitted into evidence as to the value of the agreed f…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence