RANDY FLETCHER, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1997-09-26
No. 96-3075
DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
699 So. 2d 346 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 68 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

This case addresses whether Florida's Sexual Predators Act, which requires registration for certain sex offenders, violates ex post facto laws or procedural rules. The court held that the "sexual predator" designation is a status, not a punishment, and thus does not violate these provisions.


Holding

The court held that section 775.21 does not violate the ex post facto clause or Rule 3.800. The designation of "sexual predator" is a status resulting from a conviction, not a sentence or punishment.


Headnotes

[1] Registration requirements for sexual predators are regulatory in nature and do not constitute punishment subject to constitutional ex post facto challenges.

[2] The designation of an individual as a "sexual predator" is a status resulting from a conviction, not a sentence or punishment.

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Key Quotes

“We hold that section 775.21 violates neither the ex post facto clause nor Rule 3.800 because the designation “sexual predator” is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.”

This quote directly states the court's holding regarding the constitutionality of the Act and its compliance with procedural rules.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants were convicted of sex offenses before the enactment of the Florida Sexual Predators Act. The state subsequently classified them as sexual p…

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Opinion of the Court
PETERSON, Judge.

PETERSON, Judge.

All of the appellants had been separately convicted of various sex offenses prior to the enactment of the Florida Sexual Predators Act, section 775.21, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Subsequent to enactment, the state invoked the provisions of subsection 775.21(4)(a)2 to have the appellants classified as sexual predators. The appellants claim that: (1) section 775.21 violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws and (2) the trial court had no jurisdiction to label them as sexual predators because the declaration modified their sentences more the 60 days after their imposition in violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800.

The overriding purpose of the legislation designating certain individuals as “sex ual predators” and requiring these individuals to register themselves is to protect the public from repeat sex offenders, sex offenders who use violence, and those who prey on children. See § 775.21(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).

Courts are almost universal in recognizing that registration requirements for sexual predators are designed to enable the public to protect itself from dangers posed by sexual predators who are widely regarded as having high risks of recidivism. These courts recognize that registration statutes are regulatory in nature and do not constitute punishment subject to constitutional ex post facto challenges. See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 662 A. 2d 367 (1995); State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, 869 P. 2d 1062 (1994); State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P. 2d 1217 (1992); People v. Adams, 144 Ill.2d 381, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E. 2d 637 (1991).

Cf. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F.Supp. 1372(D.Alaska 1994) and In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d 914, 191 Cal.Rptr. 658, 663 P. 2d 216 (1983).

We hold that section 775.21 violates neither the ex post facto clause nor Rule 3.800 because the designation “sexual predator” is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (34 total)

  • Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
    …ify and/or reduce the sentence. Based on this rule, Collie argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reopen his case after the sixty-day time period expired, for the purpose of designating him to be a sexual predator. In Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the Fifth District confronted this issue and held that the sexual predator designation was not an impermissible modification of the offender’s sentence more than sixty days after the imposition of the original sentence “because…
  • Mitchel Westerheide v. State, 767 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …(Fla.1999); see also Ortega v. State, 712 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 722 So. 2d 192 (Fla.), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 L.Ed.2d 563 (1998); Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1998). In Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) the Court gave the following definition: An ex post facto law has been defined by this Court as one ‘that makes a…
  • Cabrera v. State, 884 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
    …rgues general [*488] ly that the trial court was without authority to designate him a sexual predator because the determination was not made contemporaneous to his initial sentencing. We find this claim unmeritorious. As stated in Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the sexual predator designation is not an impermissible modification of an offender’s sentence “because the designation ‘sexual predator’ is neither a sentence nor a punishment.” See Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 1006 (…
    1 / 3

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