JOHN L. HAAG, JR., AND ROY L. LEVINE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLICYHOLDERS OF GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AS RECEIVER OF GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE; MILLER FAUCHER CHERTOW CAFFERTY AND WEXLER; KENT RIDGE & CRAWFORD; LEFRAK & HOLMAN; MATTHEW F. BERRY; WEBB, O'QUINN & MURPHREE, P.A.; ZWERLING, SCHACHTER, ZWERLING & KOPPELL, L.L.P.; LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN; GOODKIND LABATON RUDOFF & SUCHAROW LLP, APPELLANTS, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AS RECEIVER OF GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE; MILLER FAUCHER CHERTOW CAFFERTY AND WEXLER; KENT RIDGE & CRAWFORD; LEFRAK & HOLMAN; MATTHEW F. BERRY; WEBB, O'QUINN & MURPHREE, P.A.; ZWERLING, SCHACHTER, ZWERLING & KOPPELL, L.L.P.; LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN; GOODKIND LABATON RUDOFF & SUCHAROW LLP; AND JOHN J. HAAG, JR. AND ROY L. LEVINE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLICYHOLDERS OF GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AS RECEIVER OF GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1997-08-07
Nos. 96-2682, 96-2683 and 96-2885
ERVIN, KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
699 So. 2d 738 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Appellants challenged trial court orders approving attorney fee agreements between the Department of Insurance (as receiver) and two law firms, and denying appellants' motion for fees and costs in an insurance insolvency proceeding. The court affirmed both orders, holding that section 631.141(6) of Florida Statutes permits the receiver to enter into fee agreements subject to court approval of reasonableness, distinguishing the case from the lodestar method required in class actions.


Holding

The court held that section 631.141(6) controls and permits the Department of Insurance, as receiver, to enter into fee agreements with attorneys, with the court required only to determine the reasonableness of such agreements following an evidentiary hearing. The lodestar method required in class actions by Kuhnlein does not apply to receiver fee agreements under section 631.141(6).


Headnotes

[1] A trial court properly approves attorney's fee agreements entered into by the Department of Insurance as a receiver in a chapter 631 delinquency proceeding when the agree…

[2] Section 631.141(6), Florida Statutes (1996), requires the Department of Insurance, acting as a receiver in a chapter 631 delinquency proceeding, to enter into fee agreeme…

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Key Quotes

“the Department of Insurance acting as a receiver in a chapter 631 delinquency proceeding shall enter into a fee agreement with its attorneys, with such compensation to be paid out of the insurer's funds or assets, subject to the approval of the court”

Establishes the statutory authority for receiver fee agreements and the court's role in approving them

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Facts & Procedural History

The Department of Insurance, acting as receiver for Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company, entered into fee agreements with law firms Smith Hulsey…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, John L. Haag, Jr., Roy L. Levine and their attorneys (collectively, “Haag”), challenge the trial court’s orders (1) approving attorney’s fee agreements entered into between appellee, the Department of Insurance, and two law firms, Smith Hulsey & Busey, and Tew & Beasley, and (2) denying appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the first order, because the trial court properly approved the fee agreements pursuant to section 631.141(6), Florida Statutes (1996). We affirm the second order without comment because we conclude that, based on the partial record we have before us, it is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Contrary to Haag’s contention on appeal regarding the first" order, this case is not controlled by Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1995). There, the court stated that a fee agreement between the named plaintiffs and their attorneys in a common-fund class action cannot bind the remaining members of the class, and that in such cases the court must instead use the lodestar method to determine attorney’s fees. The ease at bar, in contrast, is controlled by section 631.141(6), which provides that the Department of Insurance acting as a receiver in a chapter 631 delinquency proceeding shall enter into a fee agreement with its attorneys, with such compensation to be paid out of the insurer’s funds or assets, subject to the approval of the court. The court’s approval means that it is required to determine the reasonableness of the fee agreement, which the court below did follow ing an evidentiary hearing. Kuhnlein cannot be read to require a trial court to disregard an agreement required by section 631.141(6) and adopt instead the lodestar approach.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Super Transp., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't OF Ins., 799 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …of collection.1 Id. Section 631.141(6) provides for the Receiver’s employment of attorneys in delinquency proceedings, to be compensated from the assets of the insolvent insurer, subject to the approval of the court. In Haag v. State, Dept. of Ins., 699 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 532 (Fla.1998), this court ruled that the trial court is required to determine the reasonableness of the Receiver’s attorney fee agreement required by section 631.141(6), and is not required to adopt th…

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