MARK J. LEVITT, APPELLANT,
v.
CYNTHIA W. LEVITT, APPELLEE
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In a marital dissolution action, the former husband appealed a trial court order compelling him to pay the former wife's $12,500 attorney's fees. The court reversed, holding that the attorney's fees provision in the marital settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous, and therefore the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret it.
The appellate court held that the attorney's fees provision was clear and unambiguous on its face, and therefore the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret it. The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the former husband unreasonably withheld his consent.
[1] A marital settlement agreement is interpreted as a matter of law like any other contract.
[2] Where the terms of a marital settlement agreement are clear and unambiguous, the parties' intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the document.
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Establishes the governing standard for interpreting marital settlement agreements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties entered into a marital settlement agreement that superseded a handwritten mediation agreement. The agreement's attorney's fees provision r…
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GUNTHER, Judge.
Appellant, Mark Levitt (“former husband”), appeals a post-judgment order granting Appellee, Cynthia Levitt (“former wife”), her attorney’s fees in a marital dissolution action. We reverse.
The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement that superseded a handwritten mediation agreement. The marital settlement agreement specifically stated that it was the entire understanding of the parties and that there were “no representations, warranties, covenants and undertakings other than those expressly set forth” in the agreement. The disputed provision in the marital settlement agreement provides that the former husband pay the balance of the former wife’s attorney’s fees in an amount not to exceed $12,500 and that “payment of this amount is subject to the Husband’s review of and consent to the Wife’s attorney’s billing records, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”
When the former wife’s counsel submitted a bill for $12,500, the former husband withheld his consent to pay on the grounds that the bill was unreasonable. Both parties then moved for the trial court to interpret the attorney’s fees provision. The trial court found the attorney’s fee provision in the marital settlement agreement to be ambiguous. After reviewing the marital settlement agreement and other extrinsic evidence, the trial court determined that the parties intended a “flat fee” arrangement and ordered the former husband to pay the $12,500 in attorney’s fees. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the attorney’s fees provision in the marital settlement agreement was ambiguous.
It is well settled that a marital settlement agreement is subject to interpretation like any other contract. See Richter v. Richter, 666 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied, 560 So. 2d 232 (Fla.1990). As with any contract, a marital settlement agreement is construed as a matter of law. See Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 666 So. 2d 957, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). As such, this Court is on equal footing with the trial court as interpreter of the written document. See id.
Where the terms of a marital settlement agreement are clear and unambigu ous, the parties’ intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the document. See Richter, 666 So. 2d at 561. It is only when a term in a marital settlement agreement is ambiguous or unclear that the trial court may consider extrinsic evidence as well as the parties’ interpretation of the contract to explain or clarify the ambiguous language. See Gorman v. Kelly, 658 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
In the instant case, the provision in the marital settlement agreement making payment of attorney’s fees subject to the former husband’s review and consent to the former wife’s attorney’s billing records is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the marital settlement agreement. See Richter, 666 So. 2d at 561. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to determine if the former husband unreasonably withheld his consent to pay the former wife’s attorney’s fees.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DELL, J., and HENNING, PATTI ENGLANDER, Associate Judge, concur.
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Crawford v. Jannie Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2011)…contract interpretation [*1251] and does not involve nuances of family law or a claim that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state law in this case.3 A marital settlement agreement is a contract. Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“It is well settled that a marital settlement agreement is subject to interpretation like any other contract.”); see also Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 679 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla.1996) (evaluating a release contained within a mar…
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Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…his construction of the prenuptial agreement. First of all, both parties stipulate, and we agree, that their prenuptial agreement is unambiguous and, as such, it is subject to a de novo review by this court as a matter of law. See Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d 755, 756-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 666 So. 2d 957, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). That said, we do not agree that the prefatory recitations contained in the various “whereas” clauses are binding, operative provisions to this otherwise…
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Burkley v. Burkley, 911 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…troactive support.1 The Mediation Agreement here does not fall into the category of contracts offering support beyond that provided for in the statutes. Settlement agreements are subject to interpretation like any other contracts. Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). “A settlement agreement should not be disturbed unless found to be ambiguous or in need of clarification, modification, or interpretation.” Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 666 So. 2d 957, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Ambiguities shou…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 666 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Raoul Vienneau v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Rodriguez v. The Honorable Geoffrey D. Cohen, 658 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- 812 Cocoa BLVD., Inc. v. City OF Cocoa, 666 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)