D.A.J., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In a juvenile delinquency case, the Florida appellate court reversed the trial court's decision to commit a child to a more restrictive placement than recommended by the Department of Juvenile Justice. The court held that the trial court's reasons for the more restrictive placement—that the child had lied on the witness stand and maintained his innocence—were constitutionally impermissible because they would chill the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
The trial court's stated reasons are constitutionally impermissible. A trial court may not base a decision to depart from the Department's recommended placement on a child's lies at trial or continued protestations of innocence, as such action would impermissibly chill the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
[1] A trial court may depart from the Department of Juvenile Justice's recommended placement for a delinquent child, but must state its reasons for doing so.
[2] A trial court's belief that a juvenile lied on the witness stand is an impermissible reason to order a more restrictive placement than recommended.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.052(4)(e)3, Florida Statutes (1995), permits trial courts to commit delinquent children to the Department at restrictiveness levels different from those recommended by the Department. However, if it elects to do so, the trial court must state its reasons.”
Establishes the legal framework allowing trial courts discretion in placement levels, conditioned on stating reasons.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant D.A.J., a child in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, was found delinquent. The trial court ordered commitment to a more restrictive placeme…
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PER CURIAM.
In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, appellant argues that the reasons given by the trial court for its decision to commit him to a more restrictive placement than that recommended by the Department of Juvenile Justice are legally insufficient. We agree and, accordingly, reverse.
Section 39.052(4)(e)3, Florida Statutes (1995), permits trial courts to commit delinquent children to the Department at restrie-tiveness levels different from those recommended by the Department. However, if it elects to do so, the trial court must state its reasons. Here, the trial court recited as reasons for its decision to order a more restrictive placement than had been recommended by the Department its belief that appellant had “lied [on] the witness stand at the trial,” and the fact that appellant had continued to maintain his innocence instead of acknowledging his guilt. We conclude that both reasons are constitutionally impermissible considerations. See, e.g., Beauvais v. State, 475 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (trial court may not depart from guidelines based on belief that defendant lied at trial because such action would impermissibly chill exercise of fifth and sixth amendment rights); A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (trial court may not base decision to depart from Department’s recommended placement of juvenile delinquent on child’s continued protestations of innocence because such action would impermissibly chill exercise of fifth and sixth amendment rights). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of commitment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
WEBSTER, LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Juvenal Pina v. Pina, 475 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)