DAVID L. BUETTNER, APPELLANT,
v.
CELLULAR ONE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, N/K/A MCCAW CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS OF FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND MCCAW CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS OF FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1997-09-03
No. 96-1650
BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
700 So. 2d 48 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant sued his employer for vicarious liability arising from an automobile accident with a deceased employee, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the employer because the direct claim against the employee was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that under respondeat superior doctrine, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable if the employee is exonerated or the claim against the employee is barred.


Holding

An appellant's vicarious liability action against an employer is barred when the claim against the employee is exonerated or time-barred, under the well-settled doctrine that a principal cannot be held liable under respondeat superior if the agent is exonerated. The employer's liability depends on the employee's liability, and dismissal of the employee's claim on statute of limitations grounds operates as an adjudication on the merits barring the vicarious liability action.


Headnotes

[1] A principal cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of an agent if the agent is exonerated.

[2] When a principal's liability rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the principal is not liable if the agent is not liable.

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Key Quotes

“when a principal's liability rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal cannot be held liable if the agent is exonerated.”

Establishes the core legal principle that employer liability under respondeat superior is derivative and cannot exceed employee liability

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant filed an action against Appellees (Cellular One, Inc. and McCaw Cellular Communications) seeking vicarious liability for allegedly negligent…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on appeal from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellant filed an action against Appellees, seeking to hold them vicariously hable for the allegedly neghgent acts of its deceased employee, Horner, based on an automobile accident involving Appellant and Horner. The trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of Homer, in Appellant’s claim against him, based on the statute of hmitations having run. The trial court then entered summary judgment for Appellees.

On appeal, Appellant contends that he is entitled to the four-year statute of hmita-tions for neghgence in his vicarious habihty action against Appellees, Horner’s employers, even though Appellant’s claim against Horner is barred under a two-year statute of hmitations.1

We hold that Appellant’s vicarious ha-bihty action against Appellees is barred by the well-settled doctrine that “when a principal’s habihty rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal cannot be held hable if the agent is exonerated.” Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla.1985); Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996, 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)(stating that “[i]n an action against an employer for the actions of the employee based upon the theory of vicarious habihty or respondeat superior, the plaintiff must show habihty on the part of the employee: ‘[I]f the employee is not liable the employer is not hable.’”)(quoting Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla.1954)).

See also Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (Fla.1987)(holding that “dismissals based on limitation statutes are adjudications on the merits for res judicata purposes”); Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F. 2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir.1990)(res judicata bars vicarious liability action against employer when employee is not liable).

Thus, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Appellees.

BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur. . The trial court entered summary judgment against Appellant in his negligence claim against Homer based on the two-year statute of limitations provided in sections 733.702(5) and 733.710, Florida Statutes. Appellant did not appeal that judgment.


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Cited By

  • Molina v. Watkins, 824 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …ability or respon-deat superior. See Williams v. Hines, 80 Fla. 690, 86 So. 695, 699 (1920) (where a jury by its verdict exonerates the servant but finds the master guilty, the verdict as to the master is erroneous.); Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (when principal’s liability rests solely on respondeat superior, principal cannot be liable if agent is exonerated); See also, e.g., Rothman, M.D., P.A. v. Hebebrand, 720 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (physician’s professional a…
  • Tsuji v. Fleet, 326 So. 3d 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
    …2013), of the Florida Probate Code. Those statutes require creditors to present claims against a decedent’s estate within two years of the decedent’s death. In support of its motion, LBC cited this Court’s decision in Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Appellants opposed the motion. Citing the Fourth District’s decision in Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), they argued that a plaintiff may bring a cause of action against a tortfeasor’s estate more than two yea…
  • Orlando Health, Inc. v. Mohan, 387 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024)

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