DAVID LISCINSKY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that testimony by an officer regarding a witness's out-of-court identification of the defendant is not hearsay if the witness testifies at trial. Any error in admitting such testimony is harmless if cumulative.
Appellant was convicted of burglary. An officer testified that a witness identified the appellant by name as the perpetrator immediately after the cri…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Hearsay Definition cases and more on FLexlaw
STONE, Chief Judge.
Appellant’s conviction for burglary is affirmed. The trial court did not err by allowing an officer to testify that a witness to the crime identified Appellant, by name, as the perpetrator at the initial investigation immediately following the incident. Such testimony is not hearsay when the identifying witness is before the court and testifies to that effect at trial. See § 90.801(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). See also Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856, 862 (Fla.1992); Harrell v. State, 647 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
We have considered our language in Stanford v. State, 576 So. 2d 737, 739-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which we stated that:
We believe that the typical situation contemplated by the code and the case law is one where the victim sees the assailant shortly after the criminal episode and says, “that’s the man.” Hence, the phrase “identification of a person made after perceiving him” refers to the witness seeing a person after the criminal episode and identifying that person as the offender. We do not believe this code provision was intended to allow other out-of-court statements by a witness to others naming the person that the witness believes committed the crime. To extend the rule that far would permit countless repetitions by a witness to others, regardless of time and place, of the witnesses’ belief as to the guilty party, a result we do not believe intended by the drafters of the rule.
That comment does not preclude admitting such identification testimony under these circumstances because the witness’ comments in the instant case were made immediately after the incident. In any event, if such were error, we deem it harmless because the officer’s testimony was merely cumulative of several other witnesses’ testimony at trial. See Erickson v. State, 565 So. 2d 328, 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Robinson v. State, 74 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…se “identification of a person made after perceiving him” refers to the witness seeing a person after the criminal episode and identifying that person as the offender. Id. at 739-40. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted.) See also Liscinsky v. State, 700 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (officer could testify under section 90.801(2) that a witness to a crime identified the accused by name, as the perpetrator at the initial investigation immediately following the incident). Therefore, the trial court was cor…
-
Denesiz Letroy Smith v. State, 880 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ible under section 90.801(2)(c). Hendrieth v. State, 483 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Therefore, accusatory statements in the form of a narrative a re not admissible into evidence pursuant to section 90.801(2)(c). But see Liscinsky v. State, 700 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding testimony that witness to crime identified defendant by name as perpetrator at initial investigation immediately following incident was admissible under section 90.801(2)(c) or, in the alternative, was harmless error).3…1 / 2
-
Davis v. State, 52 So. 3d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…g into contact with him or her. See Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla.2006); Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090 (Fla.2002); Ross v. State, 993 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Rutherford v. State, 902 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Liscinsky v. State, 700 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Stanford v. State, 576 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Investigator Troop said that Combs had recounted the facts surrounding the robbery, and told him defendant and Bellamy were the two other men involved. This did not constit…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1992)
- Erickson v. State, 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Stanford v. State, 576 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Harrell v. State, 647 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)