THOMAS MCGRAW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1997-10-15
No. 96-3749
GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur.
700 So. 2d 183 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1997) Negative Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Thomas McGraw's probation term expired on August 22, 1996, but the trial court did not issue an arrest warrant for a probation violation until August 27, 1996, and the affidavit was not filed until August 28, 1996. The court reversed the revocation and sentence because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation after the probationary period had expired without having initiated appropriate processes during the probation term.


Holding

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the violation of probation because no appropriate steps to revoke or modify probation were taken during the probationary period. Once a probation term expires, a court cannot revoke probation for violations occurring during that period unless the processes of the court were set in motion before the term ended.


Headnotes

[1] A court lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probationary term unless appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify probation du…

[2] Appropriate steps to revoke or modify probation require that the processes of the court be set in motion for revocation or modification pursuant to statute.

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Key Quotes

“Once a term of probation has expired, a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application for revocation of probation based upon a violation which occurred during the probation period unless, during the term of probation, appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify probation.”

Establishes the fundamental jurisdictional rule that probation revocation must be initiated before the probation term expires.

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Facts & Procedural History

McGraw's probation term ended on August 22, 1996. Before the term ended, his probation officer prepared an affidavit of violation of probation. Howeve…

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Opinion of the Court
GROSS, Judge.

GROSS, Judge.

Appellant’s probationary term ended on August 22, 1996. Before the term ended, appellant’s probation officer prepared an affidavit of violation of probation. However, the trial court did not issue an arrest warrant until August 27, 1996. The affidavit of violation and arrest warrant were not filed with the clerk until August 28,1996, six days after the term of probation had expired. After being arrested on the violation of probation warrant, appellant admitted the violation and the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to one year in the county jail, with credit for time served.

We reverse the revocation and sentence, because, as the state concedes, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the violation.

[Ojnce a term of probation has expired, a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application for revocation of probation based upon a violation which occurred during the probation period unless, during the term of probation, appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify probation.

Clark v. State, 402 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). “Appropriate steps” under Clark means that the processes of the court must have been set in motion for revocation or modification of the probation pursuant to section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1995). See Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1962); Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In this ease, for the trial court to have had jurisdiction, one of two things should have occurred before the probationary period expired — - either the filing of the affidavit of violation of probation with the clerk or the trial court’s issuance of the arrest warrant.1 See Carroll, 140 So. 2d at 301; Aguiar v. State, 593 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

The order of revocation of probation and sentence are reversed.

GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur. . In Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1962), the supreme court held that the processes of the trial court had "been set in motion” where the trial court had issued a violation of probation arrest warrant "within the period of probation.” 140 So. 2d at 301; see also Fryson v. State, 559 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Marcine Howard v. State, 883 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
    …ns to conduct further proceedings to determine the existence of the amended affidavit. 760 So. 2d at 1117. WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . State v. Boyd, 717 So. 2d 524 (Fla.1998), effectively overruled this court's statement in McGrawv. State, 700 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), that a violation of probation proceeding commences with "either the filing of the affidavit of violation of probation with the clerk or the trial court's issuance of the arrest warrant.” Id. at 184.…
  • Belt v. State, 748 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …robation has expired. See Francois v. State, 695 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1997); Jett v. State, 722 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Harris v. State, 720 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1998); Bostwick v. State, 703 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); McGraw v. State, 700 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Fellman v. State, 673 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The state contends that Belt’s probation did not expire until July, 1998. This construction of his sentence ignores the language indicating that the jail time was a conditio…
  • McAVOY v. State, 760 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …llant’s probation and sentenced him to one year and one day in state prison on the aggravated assault and to twenty-four days in the county jail on the resisting charge, with credit for twenty-four days time served. As we stated in McGraw v. State, 700 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997): [Ojnce a term of probation has expired, a’ court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application for revocation of probation based upon a violation which occurred during the probation period unless, during the term of proba…

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