DAVID A. ROSS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-11-12
No. 96-02920
PARKER, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
701 So. 2d 635 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

David Ross appealed the revocation of his community control, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for two alleged violations. The court found insufficient evidence for the intoxicant violation but established the residence violation, and reversed and remanded because it was unclear whether the trial court would have revoked based on the residence violation alone.


Holding

The court held that one positive drug test and a single admitted marijuana use do not establish excessive intoxicant use in violation of the condition. However, the court found the residence violation was sufficiently established by electronic monitoring and appellant's admission. Because it was unclear whether the trial court would have revoked based solely on the residence violation, reversal and remand were required.


Headnotes

[1] A single instance of drug use does not constitute excessive use of intoxicants for the purpose of violating a community control condition.

[2] Evidence of one positive drug test is insufficient to prove excessive use of intoxicants.

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Key Quotes

“The first violation, using intoxicants to excess, was not shown since evidence of one positive drug test does not amount to excessive use.”

Establishes the standard that a single positive drug test is insufficient to prove the excessive use condition violation.

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Facts & Procedural History

Ross was subject to community control with conditions including not using intoxicants to excess and being at his approved residence as required. The s…

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Opinion of the Court
CAMPBELL, Judge.

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his community control, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support it. He was found to have violated two conditions of his community control: using intoxicants to excess and failing to be in his approved residence. The trial court found appellant had violated both and, accordingly, revoked his community control. Appellant claims that the state failed to prove wilful and substantial violations. The state agrees that the intoxicant violation was not sufficiently shown, but maintains that since the other condition was established and it is not clear whether the court would have revoked based on that violation alone, the case must be reversed and remanded for new proceedings. We agree.

The first violation, using intoxicants to excess, was not shown since evidence of one positive drug test does not amount to excessive use. See Alston v. State, 646 So. 2d 184 (Fla.1994). Although appellant admitted to the community control officer that he had smoked marijuana once, this singular use does not establish excessive use. See Jones v. State, 348 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

We note parenthetically that condition seven, the intoxicant condition that appellant was charged with violating, recently overcame a constitutional vagueness challenge in Johnson v. State, 701 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). However, since appellant’s charged violation of condition seven was limited to the “excessive use” prohibition contained in that condition, we are not at liberty to find a violation of the remaining prohibitions contained in condition seven. Accordingly, our analysis must end at “excessive use.”

The second violation with which appellant was charged, that he was not at his approved residence when he was supposed to be there, was established by the community control officer’s testimony that the electronic monitoring equipment showed that appellant had not returned to his residence within an hour and a half after he left the community control office. Appellant stated that he went to see his public defender and that he knew he was not supposed to do that. Appellant’s girlfriend testified that appellant waited while she went to see her public defender, which he was also not allowed to do. The evidence showed a wilful and substantial violation.

Given the fact that the first violation was not sufficiently shown and that we have no way of knowing whether the court would have revoked appellant’s community control based on the second violation alone, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, however, we would advise the trial court, as did the Alston court, that while a positive drug test does not violate the “excessive use” condition, it does violate the community control condition directing that the community controllee live without violating the law. Similarly, while appellant’s single, admitted use of illegal drugs does not constitute “excessive use,” it may constitute another violation of condition seven. The state could thus initiate new revocation pro ceedings with a proper charge before appellant’s community control sentence expires, which is presumably in March 1998.

PARKER, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Vernia Smith v. State, 100 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …, and remanded for farther proceedings consistent with this opinion. . McGathey v. State, 71 So. 3d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Blackshear v. State, 838 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Blair v. State, 745 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Ross v. State, 701 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).…
  • LEE v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 730 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …ance, whether the tardiness alone warranted revocation. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and remand, with directions that the trial court remand to the Florida Parole Commission for further proceedings. Compare Ross v. State, 701 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (remanding because record did not reveal if court would have revoked based on second violation alone); Llumbet v. State, 698 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (remanding because it could not be told from record if the court would hav…
  • Lamario Morgan v. State, 707 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Ross v. State, 701 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); see also McLaurin v. State, 585 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). COBB, W. SHARP and ANTOON, JJ., concur.…

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