T.M., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 15-year-old appellant challenged a trial court's order imposing five days detention and 100 hours community service for aggravated assault with a firearm, arguing he was effectively committed to a residential program despite being placed in intensive community supervision with a conditional residential placement. The appellate court affirmed, holding that statutory 'commitment' requires actual official placement in confinement, not merely a conditional future possibility.
The trial court properly ordered the detention and community service because the appellant had not been committed to a residential program. The statute's requirement that mandatory detention and community service apply only when a minor is 'not committed to a residential commitment program' is satisfied when the minor is placed in community supervision with conditional residential placement, since 'commit' means to place officially in confinement or custody, which has not yet occurred.
[1] A juvenile is not "committed to a residential program" under Florida Statutes section 790.22(9)(a) when placed in an intensive community supervision program, even if a re…
[2] The plain meaning of "commit" in the context of legal confinement or custody dictates whether a juvenile has been committed to a residential program.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In this case, the pertinent meaning of "commit" is to place officially in confinement or custody.”
Establishes the court's interpretation of the statutory term 'commit,' requiring actual official placement rather than conditional future placement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceT.M., a 15-year-old, was charged with aggravated assault with a firearm. He entered a negotiated plea and was placed in an intensive community supervi…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in ordering him to spend five days in detention and perform 100 hours of community service in accordance with section 790.22(9)(a), Florida Statutes.1 Appellant, a 15-year-old who was charged with aggravated assault with a firearm, entered a negotiated plea and was placed in an intensive community supervision program, with the proviso that should he violate that supervision, he would be placed in a level VI residential program. In addition, he was ordered to spend the five days in detention and perform 100 hours of community service. The trial court ruled that because he had been given the alternative community supervision, appellant had not been committed to a residential program as envisioned by the statute. Appellant contends that he was, in effect, committed to a residential program, even though, depending on how he does under the intensive community supervision, he may never actually enter the residential program. We affirm the trial court’s ruling-based on the plain meaning of the statutory language. In this case, the pertinent meaning of “commit” is to place officially in confinement or custody. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 268 (1979). Appellant has yet to be committed, and may never be committed, to a residential program.
Our conclusion is further supported by the reasoning set forth in T.M. v. State, 689 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), in which the court noted that due to the remedial nature of this statute, it should be “accorded a liberal interpretation so as to carry out the intent of the legislature.” See id. at 445. That court also noted that “[t]he statute is obviously designed to get the immediate attention of all juveniles and to issue a ‘wake-up call’ that the state deems' their firearm offenses to be serious enough to warrant the automatic deprivation of their liberty for a period of time, even on a first offense.” See id. at 446.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, JOANOS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. . 790.22(9): Notwithstanding s. 39.043, if the minor is found to have committed an offense that involves the use or possession of a firearm, as defined in s. 790.001, other than a violation of subsection (3), or an offense during the commission of which the minor possessed a firearm, and the minor is not committed to a residential commitment program of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in addition to any other punishment provided by law, the court shall order:
(a) For a first offense, that the minor serve a mandatory period of detention of 5 days in a secure detention facility and perform 100 hours of community service.
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State v. E.D.P., 724 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1998)…definition programs such as "community counselor supervision programs.” Unfortunately, the statute does not define "community counselor supervision programs" and there is scant case law on this issue. Although not directly on point, T.M. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), provides some insight. There, the minor pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a firearm and was placed in an intensive community supervision program, in accordance with section 790.22(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), with the…
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S.C. v. Peterson, 718 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…home detention” cannot be a “commitment” referred to in section 985.231(1)(d). Our interpretation of the use of the term “commitment” in Chapter 985 is similar to that reached by the first district in construing a similar statute. In T.M. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), the issue was whether a juvenile had been “committed to a residential commitment program” within the meaning of section 790.22(9), Florida Statutes (1997), where there has been no such commitment, a court is required to impose a…1 / 2
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C.A.J. v. State, 706 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…ompletion of community control, without having received a predisposition recommendation from the Department of Juvenile Justice regarding the most appropriate restrictiveness level for appellant. In light of this court’s decision in T.M. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), we determine that the juvenile in this ease has not been “committed” within the meaning of the juvenile delinquency statute since his placement will only take place if he fails to successfully complete community control. Affir…
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- T.M. v. State, 689 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)