T.E., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A twelve-year-old juvenile was charged with arson of an unoccupied structure after witnesses observed him with a burning pipe near a wooden storage shack that subsequently caught fire. The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding of delinquency, holding that the circumstantial evidence failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the fire was accidentally started while the children were playing.
The appellate court reversed the adjudication of delinquency, holding that the circumstantial evidence failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the fire was accidentally started while the children were playing with a lighted torch, and thus did not meet the State's burden of proof.
[1] A conviction for arson requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully and unlawfully damaged a structure by fire or explosion.
[2] Circumstantial evidence of guilt must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the proof of guilt here was circumstantial, the State was required to present evidence that excluded the appellant's reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”
Establishes the legal standard for circumstantial evidence in delinquency cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA twelve-year-old appellant was playing with two other boys near a wooden storage shack on apartment complex grounds. Witness Odell Robbins saw the ap…
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COPE, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing the appellant juvenile on community control.
The twelve-year-old appellant was charged by petition with a single count of arson of an unoccupied structure in violation of section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995). At the adjudicatory hearing, one of the State’s two witnesses, Odell Robbins, testified that he had seen the appellant playing with two other boys around a wooden storage shack on the grounds of an apartment complex. Robbins testified that the appellant climbed empty-handed into the shack and then emerged ten minutes later carrying a long metal pipe with some paper burning at one end. Robbins told the appellant to extinguish the flame at the end of the pipe, and the appellant did so. Shortly thereafter, Robbins noticed that the shack was on fire and called the fire department.
Monroe County Deputy Sheriff Kent Santiago, the State’s other witness, testified that he arrived on the scene and found the shack in flames. When he subsequently questioned the appellant, he was told that one of the other boys had lighted the end of the pipe and the shed had caught on fire. Deputy Santiago could not recall precisely what part of the structure the appellant said had ignited. Deputy Santiago also testified that he did not believe the appellant intended to set fire to the shack. Based on the testimony of the two witnesses, the trial court found that the State had proven all of the elements of arson.
Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged:
(a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents;
is guilty of arson in the first degree....
As a general intent statute, section 806.01 “prohibits either a specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to result from the act.” Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), aff'd, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla.1985).
Because the proof of guilt here was circumstantial, the State was required to present evidence that excluded the appellant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989). The appellant contends that the fire was accidental. The State argues that it was substantially certain the storage shack would catch fire when the appellant lighted the piece of paper at the end of the pipe. The evidence presented at the hearing, however, does not lend support to this proposition or negate the reasonable hypothesis that, in playing with the lighted torch, the twelve-year-old appellant and his friends accidentally set fire to the shed. We conclude that the order under review must be reversed and the appellant discharged from the cause.
Reversed.
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N.K.D. v. State, 799 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…believed they had, and then left. N.K.D. said much the same thing. She related that she and S.L.F. did not break into the barn for the purpose of burning it, but just for “hanging around.” Appellants contend this case is governed by T.E. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), in which the Third District held that the state’s evidence of an alleged arson did not exclude the appellant’s reasonable hypothesis that the damage to the structure was accidental. In our judgment, T.E. is factually distinguisha…
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J.H. and C.H. v. State, 107 So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…esis of innocence that the incident was purely accidental, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand with directions that in lower court case numbers 2011-CJ-695 and 2011-CJ-696, appellants are to be discharged. See T.E. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Simultaneous to their adjudications and sentencing in the above two cases, in case numbers 2011-CJ-698 and 2011-CJ-699, appellants were found guilty of, and were sentenced for, criminal mischief. Appellants now challenge the le…
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M.T.A. v. State, 182 So. 3d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…ly any intentional fire that, got out of hand to be reclassified as a crime of arson. We..do not believe that the Legislature intended to cast such a wide net. -Although a case of purely circumstantial evidence, the Third District in T.E. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), illustrates this point. T.E., a 12-year-old, was observed by a witness playing around a storage shack. Id. at 1237. The witness observed T.E. go into the shack empty handed and later emerge with a long metal pipe with paper burni…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Ronnie S. LAW, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989)
- Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985)
- Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)