ALAN LINTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alan Linton appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, challenging the trial court's rescission of jail credit previously awarded against his prison sentence. The court reversed, holding that rescinding previously awarded jail credit constitutes an illegal enhancement of sentence that violates double jeopardy protections and exceeds the trial court's authority.
The trial court lacked authority to rescind previously awarded jail credit because it exceeded the sixty-day jurisdictional limit for sentence modification and because rescinding jail credit constitutes an illegal enhancement of sentence prohibited by the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and double jeopardy protections.
[1] A trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time under Rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[2] Rescinding previously awarded jail credit constitutes an illegal enhancement of a sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the rescinding of previously awarded jail credit is an enhancement of appellant's sentence for which there is no provision in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure”
Establishes that rescission of jail credit exceeds the trial court's authority under the procedural rules
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLinton pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted capital sexual battery and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct. He was sentenced to consecutiv…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Allen Linton, challenges the order of the trial court summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Appellant’s motion raises two grounds for relief. We affirm, without discussion, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s first claim. However, we treat appellant’s claim that the trial court improperly rescinded jail credit that it had previously awarded appellant as a motion to correct an illegal sentence1 and reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to restore the rescinded credit.
Appellant, according to his motion, entered pleas to two counts of attempted capital sexual battery and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct. He was sentenced to twenty-year prison terms on counts I and II with the sentences to run consecutively to each other. He received probationary terms on each of the counts of lewd and lascivious conduct which were run consecutively to the prison sentences and to each other.
The trial court awarded appellant credit on both count I and count II for the time he had spent in county jail prior to sentencing. The State later filed a motion to correct sentence on the basis that appellant was not entitled to jail credit against the prison sentence imposed on count II. Three months after it initially imposed sentence, the trial court granted the State’s motion and rescinded the jail credit on count II. Appellant, in his motion, argues that the trial court had the discretion to award credit on count II and, therefore, it was not an illegal sentence that could be corrected under rule 3.800(a).
He further argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify his sentence under rule 3.800(e), previously rule 3.800(b), because more than sixty days had passed since the imposition of sentence.
We agree that the trial court had no authority to rescind appellant’s jail credit under rule 3.800(c). Not only had the sixty-day jurisdictional limit passed, but the rescinding of previously awarded jail credit is an enhancement of appellant’s sentence for which there is no provision in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Gilmore v. State, 523 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
Furthermore, the enhancement of a sentence after its initial imposition violates the prohibition against double jeopardy. See Lipp man v. State, 683 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994) (double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments includes protection against enhancement of conditions of probation). Under rule 3.800(a), a trial court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it.
However, even though a defendant is not entitled to an award of jail credit against each prison term when he receives consecutive prison sentences on multiple charges,2 we conclude that such an award is not an illegal sentence where the defendant has spent time in jail on those charges.
The trial court’s action in rescinding appellant’s previously awarded jail credit constitutes an illegal enhancement of appellant’s sentence.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
BLUE, A.C.J., and QUINCE and NORTHCUTT, JJ„ concur. . See Ward v. State, 97-03003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
. See Daniels v. State, 491 So. 2d 543 (Fla.1986); Bell v. State, 610 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Wheeler v. State, 880 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…trial court summarily denied the appellant’s motion. A trial court may not sua sponte rescind jail credit previously awarded at any time even if the initial award was improper. Lebron v. State, 870 So. 2d 165, (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Linton v. State, 702 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). “[T]o increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no person shall ‘be subject for the same offense to be…
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Lebron v. State, 870 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…atedly held that a trial court may not rescind jail credit previously awarded even if the initial award was improper. See, e.g., Platt v. State, 827 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Bailey v. State, 777 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Linton v. State, 702 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for it to correct the judgment and sentence and the clerk’s certificate to reflect the 344 days of jail credit initially awarded. [*166] Affirmed, but remanded for correction of…
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Canete v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 967 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…itled to jail credit against each term when he receives consecutive prison sentences on multiple charges, such an award is permissible and does not render the sentence “illegal.” See King v. State, 913 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Linton v. State, 702 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Because the sentences imposed on Cañ-ete were neither ambiguous with respect to the awards of jail credit or even arguably “illegal,” DOC had no call to seek “clarification” of those sentences, nor did it have authority to modif…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Daniels v. State, 491 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1986)
- Gilmore v. State, 523 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Hayes v. State, 610 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Bell v. State, 610 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)