DAVID L. TAYLOR, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant whose probationary sentence exceeds the statutory maximum may have probation revoked if the violation occurs during the portion of the sentence that would have been legal. The court rejected the defendant's argument that an illegal sentence voids all probation revocations regardless of when the violation occurred.
A defendant whose probationary sentence exceeds the statutory maximum may have probation revoked if the violation occurs within the legal portion of the sentence. A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum is void only to the extent of the excess, not entirely void, and the defendant cannot escape punishment for violations occurring within the legally permissible term.
[1] A probationary sentence exceeding the statutory maximum is void only to the extent of the excess, not ab initio.
[2] A defendant who violates probation during the legally permissible portion of the sentence cannot escape punishment for the violation, even if the sentence itself was init…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant who violates his probation should not be able to escape punishment when the violation occurs during the legal portion of the sentence and the violation is unrelated to that illegality.”
Establishes the core holding that probation violations within the legal portion of sentence can result in revocation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor was convicted of driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury, a third-degree felony with a statutory maximum of five years. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Void Ab Initio cases and more on FLexlaw
GRIMES, Senior Justice.
We review Taylor v. State, 690 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), based on conflict with Cecil v. State, 614 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
Taylor was convicted of driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury, a third-degree felony., Because substantial restitution was required, without objection from Taylor and with the approval of the State, Taylor was sentenced to ten years’ probation in lieu of prison. He did not appeal the sentence. Approximately six months later, Taylor violated his probation and was sentenced to prison for thirty-eight months. He appealed the revocation of his probation on the ground that his original ten-year probationary sentence was illegal because the statutory maximum for a third-degree felony is five years. The court below acknowledged that the original sentence was illegal to the extent that it exceeded the maximum statutory authority. However, because Taylor had violated probation during the first five years, the court concluded that he was estopped to assert the illegality of the sentence after he had knowingly taken advantage of its benefits.
The court below acknowledged conflict with Jackson v. State, 654 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), in which that court relied upon Cecil v. State, 614 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), to hold that a defendant may not have probation or community control revoked for violating a condition thereof while serving an illegal sentence, regardless of whether the violation occurred within the “legal” portion of the sentence. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has recently receded-from Jackson in upholding a probation revocation when the violation occurred during the legal portion of the sentence. Collins v. State, 697 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Thus, Jackson no longer provides a basis for our jurisdiction. However, Cecil did hold, without discussion, that a defendant who had been placed on probation in excess of the statutory maximum could not have his probation revoked even though the violation occurred within the period of time that the probation could have been legally imposed.
Taylor contends that the ten-year probationary sentence was void ab initio. However, if he had appealed the sentence, his only complaint could have been directed to that portion of the probationary term which exceeded five years. Because Taylor did not enter into a plea bargain, we cannot say that principles of estoppel are applicable. However, we agree with the court in Collins which stated:
A defendant who violates his probation should not be able to escape punishment when the violation occurs during the legal portion of the sentence and the violation is unrelated to that illegality. “Sentences which exceed the maximum permitted by law are considered void to the extent by which they exceed the statutory maximum.” Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (citing Pahud v. State, 370 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)) (emphasis supplied). Therefore, the “sentence is legal so far as it is within the provisions of the statute and only void as to the excess.” Pahud, 370 So. 2d at 67.
697 So. 2d at 1307.
To accept Taylor’s position would be contrary to logic and place form over substance. Because his violation occurred within the “legal” term of his probation, the probation was properly revoked.
We approve the decision below and disapprove Cecil to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. ,
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gonzales v. State, 816 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…1305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). If the combination of probation and prison term exceeds the statutory maximum and the maximum has been expended, the balance of the probation being invalid cannot be revoked and the defendant resentenced. Taylor v. State, 702 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1997). Similarly, after revocation of probation, the combination of sanctions (prison term and probation) cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense. Collins; Meader v. State, 665 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In this cas…
-
Henderson v. State, 720 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…e legal portion of the probation. If defendant had collaterally attacked his sentence after it had been imposed, the sentence would have been void only as to the portion in excess of the statutory maximum. Id. Our supreme court, in Taylor v. State, 702 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla.1997), agreed with this court’s statement in Collins that “A defendant who violates his probation should not be able to escape punishment when the violation occurs during the legal portion of the sentence and the violation is unrelated to…
-
Baker v. State, 705 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…se the defendant violated his probation in March and August of 1994, less than a year after being placed on probation. Because his violations occurred during the legal portion of his sentence, his probation was properly revoked. See Taylor v. State, 702 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1997). In summary, we find that the defendant was lawfully placed on probation following his release from the incarcerative portion of his youthful offender sentence. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke the [*79-81] defendant…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Pahud v. State, 370 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Collins v. State, 697 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Solomon Jackson v. State, 654 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Taylor v. State, 690 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Glinder Lee Cecil v. State, 614 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)