JOSEPH RIDLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joseph Ridley appeals his convictions for felony petit theft and the trial court's imposition of habitual offender sentences under Florida Statutes § 775.084. The court holds that the 1992 amendment to § 812.014(2)(d), which deleted reference to the habitual offender statute, precluded enhancement of felony petit theft sentences under habitual offender provisions, requiring reversal and resentencing.
Felony petit theft convictions are not subject to habitual offender enhancement penalties under § 775.084. The 1992 amendment to § 812.014(2)(d), which deleted reference to the habitual offender statute, reflects legislative intent that persons prosecuted on enhanced penalty for petit theft are not subject to habitual offender penalties. Ridley's habitual offender sentences must be reversed and he must be resentenced in accordance with sentencing guidelines.
[1] A 1992 amendment to Florida Statute section 812.014(2)(d) deleted reference to the habitual offender statute, thereby changing the statute's meaning.
[2] When the legislature amends a statute by omitting reference to another statute, it is presumed to intend a different meaning from that accorded before the amendment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the legislature amends a statute by omitting words, or, in this instance, reference to a statute, the general rule of construction is to presume that the legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning from that accorded it before the amendment.”
Establishes the primary rule of statutory construction governing interpretation of the 1992 amendment deleting habitual offender reference
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRidley was charged with five counts of felony petit theft under § 812.014(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which elevates petit theft to a felony based…
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PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals challenge the trial court’s determination that Joseph Rid-ley’s convictions for felony petit theft1 were subject to further enhanced penalties under the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1995). Initially the trial court found Ridley to be a habitual offender and imposed a sentence of community control. That sanction is the subject of appeal in this court’s case number 96-02908. While that appeal was pending in this court, Ridley violated the terms of his supervision and the trial court imposed a habitual offender prison sentence, resulting in appeal number 96-04825. In this latter appeal, Ridley has agreed to forego any challenge to the trial court’s finding that he violated the terms of his supervision. The parties concur that the sentences imposed in case number 96-02908 did not comport with the penalties authorized for the crimes; the same principles apply to the challenge to the sentences in case number 96-04825, and that appeal has been decided by consent of the parties without briefing.
Prior to 1992, section 812.014(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), provided that sentencing for felony petit theft was governed by sections 775.082 (general criminal penalties), 775.083 (criminal fines), or 775.084 (habitual offenders), Florida Statutes (1991). Effective October 1,1992, however, the statute was amended by chapter 92-79, § 1, Laws of Florida, and reference to the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, was deleted. See § 812.014(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992), now renumbered as § 812.014(3)(c) (1995), the statute which is the subject of this appeal.
When the legislature amends a statute by omitting words, or, in this instance, reference to a statute, the general rule of construction is to presume that the legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning from that accorded it before the amendment. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280, 283 (Fla.1992). Additionally, the Third District has pointed out that the Committee Notes on the 1992 amendment provide that “the changes in the committee substitute provide the person who is prosecuted on an enhanced penalty for petit theft is not subject to habitual offender penalties.” Berch v. State, 691 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), citing the Staff of Fla. Comm. On Crim. Just., HB 421 (1992) Staff Analysis 6 (emphasis added in Berch.)
The trial court’s treatment of Ridley as a habitual offender when it placed him on community control, before this court in case number 96-02908, although error, has been mooted by the intervening revocation of that supervision. We dismiss that appeal. Case number 96-04825 challenges the habitual offender prison sentence Ridley now serves. We concur with Berch and the parties to this appeal. Ridley’s habitual offender sentences for convictions for felony petit theft therein must be reversed and he must be resen-tenced in accordance with the guidelines.
Appeal number 96-02908 dismissed; appeal number 96-04825 reversed and remanded for resentencing.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur. . Ridley was charged in five separate informa-tions with violating section 812.014(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which elevates the misdemeanor of petit theft to a felony if the accused has previously been convicted two or more times of any degree of theft.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By (12 total)
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Nelson v. State, 719 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…additional limitations may be found elsewhere in the statutes. An example is section 812.014, Florida Statutes, which was amended in 1992 to indicate that habitual felony offender sentencing for felony petit theft is precluded. See Ridley v. State, 702 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Berch v. State, 691 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The trial court in the present case therefore erred in imposing a habitual felony offender sentence for the appellant’s 1996 theft. The more difficult question, however, is whet…
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Wilson v. State, 752 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…, Laws of Florida, and the reference to section 775.084 (habitual offenders) was deleted. In Gayman, the court did not apply the amended statute and that statute is applicable to Wilson’s 1995 case and perhaps to his 1993 cases. In Ridley v. State, 702 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the court noted that when the legislature amends a statute by omitting words or reference to a statute, the general rule of construction is to presume that the legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning. The cou…
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Baker v. State, 724 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…heft was not subject to enhancement under the habitual felony offender statute because the legislature, in 1992, amended section 812.014, Florida Statutes, to eliminate habitual felony offender sentencing for felony petit theft. See Ridley v. State, 702 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d [*122] DCA 1997); Berch v. State, 691 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The issue is whether appellant may raise on direct appeal this sentencing error, which was never objected to by his trial counsel. In Nelson v. State, we considered whe…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992)
- Berch v. State, 691 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)