STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERTO BLANCO, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's order granting a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal in a concealed firearm case. The appellate court held that the trial court erred because the jury could lawfully find the firearm was concealed based on the evidence presented, and reversed the acquittal order to reinstate the jury's conviction.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment of acquittal because the jury could lawfully find from the evidence that the firearm was concealed as defined under the statute. A weapon need not be completely hidden from all possible observation to be concealed; its visibility from outside a vehicle does not preclude it from being concealed as a matter of law.
[1] A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted only when no reasonable view of the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the opposing party, can sustain a…
[2] A defendant moving for a judgment of acquittal admits the facts stated in evidence and all reasonable inferences favorable to the opposing party that a jury might draw.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Motions for judgment of acquittal should only be granted when there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take favorable to the opposing party that can be sustained under the law.”
Establishes the legal standard for granting a judgment of acquittal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Blanco was initially convicted by a jury of carrying a concealed firearm. After conviction, Blanco renewed his prior motion for judgment of a…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
The State challenges the trial court order granting appellee’s motion for judgment of acquittal. We agree with the State that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion and reverse.
Appellee was convicted by a jury of carrying a concealed firearm. Thereafter, appel-lee renewed his prior motion for judgment of acquittal, and the trial judge reserved ruling. The trial court subsequently granted appel-lee’s motion, finding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Motions for judgment of acquittal should only be granted when there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take favorable to the opposing party that can be sustained under the law. See Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 287 (Fla.1995)(eiting Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323 (Fla.1991)). In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant admits not only the facts stated in evidence, but also every conclusion favorable to the adverse. party that a jury might favorably and reasonably infer from the evidence. See Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1974).
In order to prove that a weapon is “concealed,” the weapon must be on or about the person and hidden from the ordinary sight of another person. “Ordinary sight of another person” means the casual and ordinary observation of another in the normal associations of life. See State v. Pollock, 600 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). A weapon’s possible visibility from outside a vehicle may not, as a matter of law, preclude it from being “concealed” within the meaning of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1995). See Pollock. After a review of the record and case law, it is clear that the jury in the instant ease could lawfully find from the evidence presented that the firearm discovered between the seats of appellee’s vehicle was in fact concealed as that term is defined under the statute. See §§ 790.01; 790.001, Fla. Stat. (1995). The trial judge therefore erred in granting appellee’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting appellee’s motion for judgment of acquittal and remand for reinstatement of the jury verdict.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Davis v. State, 761 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…a manner that would conceal the firearm from another person’s “ordinary sight.” § 790.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). “Ordinary sight” means “the casual and ordinary observation of another in the normal associations of life.” See State v. [*1157] Blanco, 702 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We conclude that the State’s evidence fails under either of two rationales. First, Mr. Davis’s post-Miranda admission that he was holding the gun for someone else was inadmissible until the State produced independent evide…
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N.H. v. State, 111 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…792 (Fla.2002)). We turn first to the concealed firearm charge. The crime can be proven by evidence that the weapon was within a defendant’s possession or ready reach and that it was hidden from the sight of an ordinary person. See State v. Blanco, 702 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(holding that a weapon stashed between the seats of a car was concealed). But see State v. Weyant, 990 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (determining that an unloaded firearm wedged between car seats did not qualify as concealed when t…
Authorities Cited
- Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974)
- Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Pollock, 600 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)