STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT,
v.
TREVOR A. MICHELIN, ET AL., APPELLEE
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Florida DOT's appeal is granted and the case is reversed for new trial because severance damages attributable to the owner's need to comply with handicapped parking regulations are not compensable under eminent domain law.
Severance damages resulting from the owner's obligation to comply with handicapped parking regulations are not compensable in an eminent domain taking.
[1] Severance damages resulting from a property owner's obligation to comply with police power regulations, such as handicapped parking requirements, are not compensable in a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florida DOT widened Davie Boulevard in Broward County, taking a portion of the appellee's entrance to a strip shopping center. The owner's apprais…
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PER CURIAM.
When the Florida DOT widened Da-vie Boulevard in Broward County, the taking included a portion of the appellee landowner’s entrance to a strip shopping center. Over the DOT’s objection, owner’s appraiser included in his opinion as to severance damages the fact that the owner would lose parking spaces because he would now have to have a handicapped parking space. The appraiser would not allocate what portion of the severance damages was attributable to parking.
Compliance with police power regulations is not compensable under Florida eminent domain law. State Dept. of Transp. v. Bennett, 592 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Malone v. Division of Admin., State of Florida Dept. of Transp., 438 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); and Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin Co., 171 So. 2d 873 (Fla.1965). In those cases the owners were exempt from compliance with regulations prior to the taking, because their businesses were in operation before the regulations became applicable to their property. In the present ease, the owner was not. He sees this as a way to distinguish those cases; however, that distinction only makes his position even more untenable than it would have been if he had been exempt prior to the taking. We therefore reverse for a new trial.
POLEN, KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., coneur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin Cnty., 171 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1965)
- Malone v. Division of Administration, 438 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- State v. Bennett, 592 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)