BERNARD ALLEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1997-12-10
No. 95-04970
PARKER, C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
703 So. 2d 1162 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Bernard Allen appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of drug paraphernalia found during a police encounter. The Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the initial direction for Allen to exit his vehicle constituted an unlawful investigatory stop lacking the required well-founded suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore reversed the lower court's denial of the suppression motion.


Holding

The court held that Officer Merlin lacked well-founded suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the investigatory stop. The direction to exit the vehicle constituted a show of authority that restrained Allen's freedom of movement, and without articulable suspicion of a crime, the detention was unlawful. Therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of that detention should have been suppressed.


Headnotes

[1] An investigatory stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment only when an officer possesses a well-founded, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, is committ…

[2] A mere or bare suspicion of criminal activity is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop.

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Key Quotes

“That encounter became an investigatory stop when the officer directed the men to get out of the ear.”

Establishes that directing a person to exit a vehicle transforms a permissible approach into an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion.

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Facts & Procedural History

A St. Petersburg police officer was investigating at a motel based on a manager's request to check on some people, with no information about unlawful …

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Bernard Allen pleaded no contest to a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia, while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress the physical evidence against him. We agree with Allen’s assertion that the evidence was the fruit of his unlawful detention by the arresting officers. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of Allen’s motion to suppress.

St. Petersburg Police Officer Byron Merlin was searching for an individual at a motel, when the motel manager asked him to investigate some people on the other side of the budding. The manager provided no information concerning any unlawful activity. When Officer Merlin drove around the building he observed some pedestrians, and he saw Allen and a passenger sitting in a ear. Officer Merlin parked his patrol unit and walked over to Allen’s vehicle. He saw Allen and the passenger changing shoes, but he observed no illegal activity. He approached Allen’s car, requested identification, and asked the passenger to roll down his window. The officer then asked or ordered Allen and the passenger to get out of the ear. As Allen exited the vehicle, he placed a baggie on the passenger-side floorboard. After backup officers arrived, another officer asked Allen for consent to search the vehicle. At the suppression hearing before the circuit court, Allen and the officers disagreed as to whether Allen consented. The officer did not shout or brandish his weapon at Allen, but Allen testified that he felt intimidated and thought that his leaving would be prohibitéd. In any event, the officers entered the car and retrieved the baggie.

A presumptive test indicated the presence of cocaine in the baggie. The officers arrested Allen and his passenger and placed them in the rear of a patrol unit. Although later tests disclosed that, in fact, there was no cocaine in the baggie, a search of the police cruiser in which Allen and his passenger had been held produced a glass vial with trace amounts of cocaine.

Officer Merlin was within his authority to approach Allen and his passenger and to ask for their identification. But that encounter became an investigatory stop when the officer directed the men to get out of the ear. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1993). Whether the direction to exit the vehicle was in the form of a request or an order, it constituted a show of authority which restrained Allen’s freedom of movement because a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he should comply. To justify such a stop under the Fourth Amendment, the officer must have a well-founded, articulable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. A mere or bare suspicion is not sufficient. Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186.

Officer Merlin did not have the well-founded suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify his investigatory stop of Allen and his passenger. Therefore, the detention of the men was unlawful. Allen’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of that detention should have been granted. Popple, 626 So. 2d at 188. See also, Zelinski v. State, 695 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Alvarez v. State, 695 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

We reverse and remand with directions to discharge Allen.

PARKER, C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Barnes v. State, 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …State v. Luster, 596 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1992); State v. Donaldson, 579 So. 2d 728 (Fla.1991); State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1989); and Craft v. State, 517 So. 2d 691 (Fla.1988). Ashley involved an ongoing prosecution. See also Allen v. State, 703 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); State v. Taplis, 684 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); State v. Ashley, 670 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Guthrie, 666 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); State v. Poole, 665 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); State v. Campbell…
  • State v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …ame); Brown v. State, 744 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(same); Danielewicz v. State, 730 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police only observe car legally parked in parking lot at 1:30 a.m.); Allen v. State, 703 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police only observe legally parked car in parking lot); Alvarez v. State, 695 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police observe legally parked c…
  • Bryant v. State, 779 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …ich an officer may reasonably detain a person temporarily to investigate a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. See § 901.151, Fla. Slat. (1999); Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186; Allen v. State, 703 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).…

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