CORY ELLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Cory Ellis appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his enhanced habitual felony offender sentence was improperly imposed following convictions for possession with intent to sell marijuana and cocaine. The court agrees, holding that the habitual felony offender sentencing statute explicitly exempts convictions under Florida's drug possession statute, and reverses for resentencing.
A criminal defendant convicted only of a violation of the purchase or possession portions of section 893.13, Florida Statutes may not receive an enhanced sentence under the habitual felony offender statute, as the statute explicitly exempts such convictions without limitation based on the amount of substance possessed or the defendant's intent.
[1] A criminal defendant convicted solely of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance under section 893.13, Florida Statutes, is exempt from enhanced sentencing…
[2] The habitual felony offender statute's exemption for violations of section 893.13 relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance is not limited by the a…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The habitual felony offender sentencing statute specifically exempts from its application criminal defendants who are convicted of "a violation of s.893.13 relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance."”
Establishes the statutory exemption that controls the case and makes the enhanced sentence illegal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEllis was convicted of possession with intent to sell marijuana and cocaine in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes. The trial court imposed …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Binding Precedent cases and more on FLexlaw
FLETCHER, Judge.
Cory Ellis appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, contending that his enhanced habitual felony offender sentence was improperly imposed following his convictions on charges of possession with intent to sell marijuana and cocaine, § 893.13, Fla. Stat. (1993). We agree with Ellis and reverse and remand with directions that the habitual felony offender sentence imposed be vacated and that Ellis be resentenced.
The habitual felony offender sentencing statute specifically exempts from its application criminal defendants who are convicted of “a violation of s.893.13 relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance.” See § 775.084(l)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (1993); Barber v. State, 699 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Baldwin v. State, 684 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Grene v. State, 702 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(modified on other grounds en banc, Sept. 3, 1997).
In making its ruling below, the trial court had before it the Grene decision from this court, yet declined to follow its mandatory authority. Instead, the trial court attempted to distinguish Ellis’ case based on its perception of the legislative intent behind section 775.084, Florida Statutes and the amount of controlled substance Ellis possessed at the time of his arrest (which the court believed showed it was not possessed for Ellis’ personal use).
This distinction cannot be approved however, because Ellis, as in Grene, was charged with and convicted only of a possession with intent to sell violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes, not with the actual sale of the controlled substances, see, e.g. Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), and the habitual felony offender statute clearly exempts such convictions from its coverage without any limitation based on the amount of substance possessed or the defendant’s subjective intent regarding personal use. Further, despite the numerous opinions from this and other District Courts of Appeal decided in 1995 and 1996 holding that convictions for possession with intent to sell under section 893.13 cannot receive habitual felony offender sentencing treatment,1 the Florida Legislature met in 1997 and specifically reenacted section 775.084 without making any changes to subsection (l)(a)3. See eh. 97-97, Laws of Fla. Under such circumstances, the legislature is presumed to have been aware of the construction placed on the statute by the courts and to have adopted that construction. See Wood v. Fraser, 677 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Finally, although we understand the trial court’s good intentions, when confronted with binding precedent, trial judges are obliged to follow that precedent even if they might wish to decide the ease differently. Wood, 677 So. 2d at 19. Unless and until section 775.084(l)(a)3, Florida Statutes is changed, a criminal defendant convicted only of a violation of either the purchase or possession portions of section 893.13, Florida Statutes may not receive an enhanced sentence under the habitual felony offender statute.
Reversed, sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.
. See, e.g., Barber; Grene; Harris v. State, 695 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Baldwin; Wright v. State, 683 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Houser v. State, 666 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)…t occurred when the defendant received a habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine, another offense that does not qualify for habitualization under the statute. See Marrero v. State, 741 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Ellis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In Bover, however, a decision that was issued after Beaudoin and Ellis but before Marrero, the Third District appears to have taken a more narrow view of what constitutes an illegal sentence. 732 So. 2d at 1190. In Bover,…
-
Dougherty v. State, 33 So. 3d 732 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…fendant was subject to habitual felony offender sanctions. That interpretation is inconsistent with controlling precedent. See Daniels v. State, 679 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Pittman v. State, 733 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Ellis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The statute reflects the legislative intent to exempt purchase or possession of controlled substances from habitual felony [*734] offender enhanced sentencing. Although acquiring a controlled substance by misrepresentation, frau…
-
Adams v. State, 724 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…(Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1992). A claim that one has been habitualized on a drug possession charge, when the statute [*138] does not allow such sentencing, is cognizable on a rule 3.800(a) motion. See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wood v. John Fraser, M.D., 677 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Watson Grene v. State, 702 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Houser v. State, 666 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Baldwin v. State, 684 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Kendrick Harris v. State, 695 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Cruz v. State, 699 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Barber v. State, 699 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Wright v. State, 683 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Hugenson Metellus v. State, 683 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)