MAX BROFMAN, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA HEARING CARE CENTER, INC. AND RICHARD NAVARRO, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, RESPONDENTS
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A trial judge made a joke at a motion hearing concerning a plaintiff's hate crime lawsuit. The plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify the judge, arguing the joke would prevent him from receiving a fair trial. The appellate court granted the writ of prohibition and ordered reassignment to a different judge, holding that the objective effect of the judge's remark on a reasonable party, not the judge's subjective intent, controls the disqualification analysis.
The court held that the motion to disqualify was legally sufficient and granted the writ of prohibition. The judge's remarks could reasonably lead the petitioner to believe the judge viewed his allegations of religious-based beating as trifling or farcical, preventing a full and fair hearing, and thus the judge should be disqualified and the case reassigned.
[1] A motion to disqualify a trial judge is legally sufficient if the facts alleged, taken as true, would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that they could not recei…
[2] The standard for disqualification is the reasonable effect of a judge's remarks on the party seeking disqualification, not the subjective intent of the judge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial”
States the legal standard for determining sufficiency of a disqualification motion
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner Brofman brought a civil lawsuit under the hate crime statute against Florida Hearing Care Center and Richard Navarro, alleging he was beate…
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STEVENSON, Judge.
This is a petition for writ of prohibition wherein the petitioner seeks disqualification of the trial judge assigned to the civil suit which petitioner brought under the hate crime statute. The petition is predicated on a “joke” concerning petitioner’s cause of action allegedly made by the trial judge at a motion hearing. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify below, supported by his affidavit that the remark caused him to fear that he would not receive a fair trial from the trial judge. The trial judge denied the motion as legally insufficient. We disagree and grant the writ.
The test for determining the legal sufficiency of a motion for disqualification is whether “the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial.” Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
We believe that the remarks in the instant case could have led petitioner to reasonably believe that the trial judge viewed the allegations in the lawsuit, in particular petitioner’s claims that he was beaten because of his religion, as trifling or even farcical and that a full and fair hearing could not be obtained before that judge.1 While the trial judge may have meant the remark to be a joke, rather than a reflection on his belief as to the merits of the petitioner’s complaint, the standard is the reasonable effect on the party seeking disqualification, not the subjective intent of the judge. See State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (1938), quoted in Hayslip, 400 So. 2d at 556. Jokes by the trial judge are a risky venture in any event, and the closer the joke to the subject matter of the litigation, the greater the risk that the attempted humor will, in one way or another, be inappropriate.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and remand this case for assignment to a different trial judge.
GROSS, J., and PARIENTE, BARBARA J., Associate Judge, concur. . We see no need to reproduce the text of the joke here. While the joke was not particularly offensive to race or religion, it was not particularly funny either.
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Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cnty., 810 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…sufficiency of a motion for disqualification is whether the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he or she could not get a fair and impartial trial. Brofman v. Florida Hearing Care Center, 703 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). It is not a question of how the judge actually feels but rather what feeling resides in the affiant’s mind and the basis for such feeling. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In reviewing a motion to disqualify…
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Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…“legally sufficient.” A motion is legally sufficient if ‘“the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial.’ ” Brofman v. Fla. Hearing Care Ctr., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). A mere “subjective fear[ ]” of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 2…
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Molina v. Perez, 187 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…cy of a motion for disqualification, the test is “whether ‘the facts alleged (which must be taken as true) would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial.’ ” Brofman v. Fla. Hearing Care Ctr., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In reviewing a petition based upon comments made by the trial court, “the standard is the reasonable effect on the party seeking disqualification, not the subjective intent of the judge.” Vivas v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 7…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hayslip v. The Honorable Paul T. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- State v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566 (Fla. 1938)