CHARLES PRYOR, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Charles Pryor appeals a 1997 sentence imposed for violating probation, arguing that an earlier 1992 sentence was illegal because it exceeded the statutory maximum for youthful offenders by imposing ten years of probation. The court affirms, holding that the sentences were proper and that Pryor's appeal was procedurally barred.
The court affirmed the sentences, holding that they were proper and that credit for time served on probation or community control is awarded only towards a new sentence of probation or community control, or the probation portion of a split sentence, not toward the prison term portion.
[1] An appellate court may affirm a sentence if the defendant's challenge was not properly preserved for review and does not demonstrate fundamental error.
[2] A defendant must object to an allegedly improper sentence in the trial court and timely raise the objection on appeal to preserve the issue for review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“credit for time served on probation or community control is awarded only towards a new sentence of either probation or community control, or towards the probation/community control portion of a split sentence, not toward the prison term portion of a split sentence”
Establishes the governing legal rule that time served on probation cannot be credited against the incarcerative portion of a sentence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1989, Pryor was sentenced as a youthful offender to four years in prison followed by one year community control. In 1992, following violation of co…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm.
Charles Pryor appeals the sentence imposed, in 1997, following Pryor’s violation of probation in ease 89-8866. He claims that the sentence imposed in 1992 for violating community control on ease 89-8866 of six years followed by ten years probation was illegal, as the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a youthful offender. Basically, Pryor alleges that because the ten-year probation period was improperly imposed in 1992, violation of that probation in 1997 was impossible, making the 1997 sentence illegal.
In 1989, Pryor was sentenced as a youthful offender in case 89-8866 to four years in prison followed by one year community control. He violated his community control and, at revocation proceedings in 1992, was sentenced to six years in prison followed by ten years probation. He was credited with time already served while incarcerated, 671 days. This sentence was to run concurrent with the sentence in case 91-12743, a substantive violation of probation/community control, in which Pryor was ordered to serve ten years in prison followed by ten years probation. In 1997, Pryor was found to have violated probation; at revocation proceedings, he was sentenced to prison for six years on ease 89-8866 and, on case 91-12743, to 15 years on count one, 15 years (consecutive) on count two and 15 years (concurrent) on the remaining counts.
Pryor’s appeal is barred, as it was not properly preserved for review and does not show fundamental error on the part of the sentencing court. See § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996); Callins v. State, 698 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), citing Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla.1985). Pryor did not object to the allegedly improper sentence below nor did he timely raise his objection on appeal. See § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b).
Even if it had been properly preserved for review, Pryor’s position is without merit. Regarding his 1992 sentencing, Pryor is implicitly claiming that his time previously served on probation should have been credited towards the six-year sentence imposed. It is well established, however, that credit for time served on probation or community control is awarded only towards a new sentence of either probation or community control, or towards the probation/community control portion of a split sentence, not toward the prison term portion of a split sentence. See Young v. State, 697 So. 2d 75 (Fla.1997); State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla.1978). This is true even where the prior time on probation or community control, when added to the inearcerative period, would cause the sentence to exceed the statutory maximum for the offense. Young, 697 So. 2d at 75, 77.
Accordingly, the sentences imposed at the 1992 and 1997 revocation proceedings were proper and we hereby affirm.
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Mizell v. State, 716 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…State, 714 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Because we are able to reach what we think is the correct result without doing so, we respectfully decline, at least in this ease, to involve ourselves in this fratricidal warfare. But see, Pryor v. State, 704 So. 2d 217, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(“appeal ... barred, as it was not properly preserved for review and does not show fundamental error”). It is apparent that, even if arguendo Maddox is correct that defense counsel’s failure to present the point precludes rev…
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Jordan v. State, 728 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…offense is thirty-two years. Defendant’s argument was never made in the trial court. However, this court may entertain an unpreserved sentencing error which would constitute fundamental error. See § 924.051, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996); Pryor v. State, 704 So. 2d 217, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 289, 289-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Stone v. State, 688 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 697 So. 2d 512 (Fla.1997). A sentence in excess of the statutory maximum is fundamental erro…
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Wagner Mora v. State, 964 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…served for appeal. The issue is also not fundamental, as the alleged error had no effect on the validity of the probation violation hearing or the ultimate sentence imposed. See, e.g., Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007); Pryor v. State, 704 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (defendant’s appeal is barred, as it was not properly preserved for review and does not show fundamental error on the part of the sentencing court); see also § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). Not only was this issue not preserved…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1978)
- Young v. State, 697 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1997)
- Callins v. State, 698 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)