TEAYOIR SCANTLING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court receded from prior precedent, holding that a sentence for an offense committed while on control release can be made consecutive to the sentence for the control release violation. This is because the control release violation results in the continuation of the original sentence, not a new one.
Yes, a sentence for an offense committed while on control release may be made consecutive to the sentence for the control release violation. The violation of control release results in the continuation of the original sentence, not a new, undetermined sentence.
[1] A sentence for an offense committed while on control release may be made consecutive to the sentence to be served for the violation of control release.
[2] A violation of control release does not necessarily result in a new and undetermined sentence; rather, an inmate may be returned to prison for the continued service of th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The appellant contends that the sentence imposed for an offense which he committed while on control release may not be made consecutive to the sentence to be served in connection with the violation of control release.”
States the appellant's main argument on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant committed an offense while on control release. The trial court imposed a sentence for this new offense, ordering it to be consecutive to…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant contends that the sentence imposed for an offense which he committed while on control release may not be made consecutive to the sentence to be served in connection with the violation of control release. Although Currelly v. State, 678 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), provides support for this contention, we recede from this aspect of Currelly. The present ease is thus being considered en banc by the court’s criminal division pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b).
The appellant was imprisoned under a sentence for an earlier offense, and after serving a portion of that term he was placed on control release and then committed another offense. In imposing the present sentence for this offense the court indicated that this sentence would be consecutive to “the sentence he is currently serving.” However, the appellant notes that the sentencing papers indicate that the present sentence would be consecutive to any sentence received for violation of control release, and that this is precluded by Currelly under the theory that the present sentence would be consecutive to an undetermined future sentence. See also Lyons v. State, 672 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
But we disagree with the apparent assumption in Currelly and Lyons that a violation of control release will result in a new and undetermined sentence to be imposed in the future. An inmate on control release has already been sentenced for the earlier offense, and pursuant to section 947.141(4), Florida Statutes, an inmate violating control release may be returned to prison for the continued service of that sentence. Because this is not a new sentence, and the inmate is instead imprisoned under a sentence which has previously been determined and imposed, a separate consecutive sentence for another offense committed while on control release is not thereby precluded. We recede from Currelly in this regard, and acknowledge conflict with Lyons. The present case is therefore affirmed.
MINER, WEBSTER, MICKLE, LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Teayoir Scantling v. State, 711 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1998)…WELLS, Justice. We have for review Scantling v. State, 704 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in Lyons v. State, 672 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the First District Court of…
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Wyon Dale Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (exercising en banc jurisdiction to overrule a previous case and recede from two previous decisions because “[e]xamining the question anew, we find no statutory basis for our earlier conclusion”); Scantling v. State, 704 So. 2d 565, 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[W]e recede from this aspect of Currelly [v. State, 678 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)].”), approved by 711 So. 2d 524 (Fla.1998); Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 703 So. 2d 1202, 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“However, we reced…1 / 2
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Mincey v. State, 703 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…t reflect the terms of the other sentence. We came to that conclusion in Lyons because of Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1899); however, we note that the first district disagrees with Lyons and has certified conflict. Scantling v. State, 704 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Unlike Lyons, this is not a direct appeal, but rather a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800, the only avenue of relief open to appellant at this point. Because the sentence does not exceed the maximum period set forth by law f…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Currelly v. State, 678 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Luke v. State, 672 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Lyons v. State, 672 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)