PHILIP THOMPSON AND ELUTHERA FISHING CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROBERT C. HIBNER, BARNETT BANK OF SOUTH FLORIDA, N.A., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Plaintiffs appealed a summary judgment granting homestead exemption to defendant's property. The court affirmed, holding that even if a separate structure on the property was previously used as a corporate office, the exemption applies because the corporation was inactive and non-income-producing at the time the judgments were obtained.
The trial court properly ruled that the defendant was entitled to homestead exemption status because the record did not demonstrate that the separate structure was being used as a business office in 1991 when plaintiffs obtained the judgments. Although homestead protection generally should not extend to income-producing portions of property, that rule does not apply when the income-producing use has ceased.
[1] A trial court's error in excluding evidence is harmless if it does not affect the outcome of the case.
[2] Homestead protection generally does not extend to severable, income-producing portions of a debtor's property.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the general rule [provides] that homestead protection should not extend to [severable] income producing portions of the debtor's property”
Establishes the general principle that income-producing property portions typically do not receive homestead protection, though it does not apply here.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant's property contained a separate structure at the rear. A predecessor in title's 1989 deposition testified the structure was used as a corpor…
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal a final summary judgment determining that defendant’s property is entitled to homestead exemption. We affirm.
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in excluding the deposition of defendant’s predecessor in title from evidence when it ruled on the summary judgment motion. Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court should have considered the deposition in determining the entitlement to homestead status, the error is harmless. Although the “general rule [provides] that homestead protection should not extend to [severable] income producing portions of the debtor’s property,” First Leasing & Funding of Fla., Inc. v. Fiedler, 591 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), that rule is clearly not dispositive of this case. In the 1989 deposition, the predecessor in title testified that he had used the separate structure at the rear of the property as a corporate office for Deep Sea Fisheries, Inc.
However, that testimony fails to establish the non-homestead status of the separate structure. Notwithstanding the use of the structure set forth in the 1989 deposition, this evidence does not prove the use of the structure in 1991 when plaintiffs obtained the judgments sued upon.
The record indicates that the corporation was not income producing after 1990.
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the corporation was inactive at that time: Deep Sea Fisheries, Inc., was administratively dissolved on Nov. 9, 1990.1 As the record does not demonstrate that the separate structure was used as a business office when plaintiffs obtained the judgments, the trial court properly ruled that the defendant was entitled to homestead exemption status. See Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig, 652 F.Supp. 1409 (S.D.Fla.1987).
Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment.
Affirmed^
. Although the corporate documents list the property address as the corporate offices of Blue Water Fisheries, Inc., and T-Jett Enterprises, Inc., the deposition does not address the use of the separate structure for those corporate offices. Cf. First Leasing & Funding of Fla., Inc., 591 So. 2d at 1152 (rental units with separate mailing addresses not entitled to homestead exemption).
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Anderson v. Letosky, 304 So. 3d 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…present case, the rented areas each consisted of a single room. 4The court distinguished In re Englander, 95 F. 3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996), First Leasing, 591 So. 2d 1152, In re Wierschem, 152 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993), and Thompson v. Hibner, 705 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), noting that those cases provide "for the partial or complete disallowance of the homestead exemption in cases where severable portions of the property, usually multi-unit properties, are used solely for income-producing or busine…
Authorities Cited
- Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig, 652 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
- First Leasing & Funding OF Fla., Inc. v. Lowell C. Fiedler, 591 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)