PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD AND F.A. RICHARD, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APELLEES,
v.
ROOSEVELT U. PAULK, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The appellate court reversed a lower court's order regarding prejudgment interest on attorney fees in a workers' compensation case. The court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court concerning when prejudgment interest accrues on attorney fees in such cases.
The court reversed the lower court's order granting prejudgment interest on attorney fees. The court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the accrual of prejudgment interest on attorney fees in workers' compensation cases.
[1] Prejudgment interest on attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases may not accrue from the date entitlement is determined if the amount of the fee has not yet been es…
[2] A criminal penalty provision in a statute may preclude the tender of a fee, thereby impacting the accrual of prejudgment interest.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reverse the order granting prejudgment interest on one portion of the attorney fee award from September 17, 1991, and on another portion from January 11, 1996, pursuant to Wells Fargo Armored Services, Inc. v. Lee, 692 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), review granted, 699 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1997).”
Establishes the court's decision to reverse the lower court's award of prejudgment interest and references a key precedent.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe lower court awarded prejudgment interest on portions of an attorney fee award from different dates. The appellant argued that prejudgment interest…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the order granting prejudgment interest on one portion of the attorney fee award from September 17, 1991, and on another portion from January 11, 1996, pursuant to Wells Fargo Armored Services, Inc. v. Lee, 692 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), review granted, 699 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1997). Because of our disposition, it is unnecessary to consider the cross-appeal, which asserted that prejudgment interest should have been awarded on the entire fee award from September 17, 1991. Nevertheless, we certify the same question certified in Wells Fargo:
Does the court’s decision in Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley Smith, Inc., 670 So. 2d 929 (Fla.1996), extend to permit the accrual of prejudgment interest on attorney’s fees, authorized pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law, from the date entitlement to the fee is determined, when an amount for same has not yet been . established?
In certifying the above question, we note that appellant has raised an argument this court has not previously considered. Appellant contends that this court properly found that Quality Engineered Installation was not controlling in workers’ compensation cases, because of the criminal penalty provisions contained in chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Appellant explains that the award of prejudgment interest in Quality Engineered Installation was supported under the theory that the accrual of prejudgment interest could be avoided by tendering the fee. Appellant points out that under section 440.34(6), Florida Statutes (1989), which has since been transferred to section 440.105(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), it is a misdemeanor for anyone to receive a fee in a workers’ compensation case for services rendered unless the judge of compensation claims has approved the fee. This criminal penalty provision, appellant contends, precludes it from tendering a fee.prior to final approval by the judge and thereby bolsters the correctness of this court’s decision in Wells Fargo.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN, KAHN and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
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Paulk v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Crawford & Co., 711 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 1998)…WELLS, Judge. We have for review Palm Beach County School Board v. Paulk, 705 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), certifying the following question to be of great public importance: Does the court’s decision in Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley South, Inc., 670 So. 2d 929 (Fla.1996), extend to permit the accrual of prejudgme…
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Pub. Health Trust/Jackson Mem'l Hosp. & Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Spencer, 826 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…s been approved by the JCC. As stated in Lee, there is no entitlement to prejudgment interest until the amount of the fee has been approved. See Lee v. Wells Fargo Armored Services, 707 So. 2d at 700; accord Palm Beach County School Board v. Paulk, 705 So. 2d 37 (prejudgment interest on attorney’s fees authorized pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law does not accrue from date of determination of entitlement where amount has not yet been established); Mims v. Lipton Toyota, Inc., 709 So. 2d 106 (Fla.1998)(sa…
Authorities Cited
- Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley S., Inc., 670 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1996)
- Wells Fargo Armored Servs. & The Travelers v. LEE, 692 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)