GERARDO PICI, APPELLANT,
v.
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Gerardo Pici appeals an award of attorney's fees to First Union National Bank following litigation over a boat loan. The court reverses the fee award, finding that the contractual fee provision did not apply because First Union's only successful claim was for replevin (possession) based on a nonmonetary default, not a claim for money owed.
The court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that the fee provision was not activated because First Union's only successful claim was a replevin action based on a nonmonetary default, not a claim seeking money owed from Pici. Attorney's fee provisions must be strictly construed, and First Union's provision did not extend to fees for successful pursuit of nonmonetary defaults.
[1] Attorney's fee provisions in contracts are strictly construed.
[2] A contractual provision for attorney's fees for collecting money owed is not activated by a successful replevin action based on a nonmonetary default.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Attorney's fee provisions are to be strictly construed.”
Establishes the standard of interpretation applied to the contractual fee provision at issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1991, Pici executed a promissory note and security agreement with First Union for an $18,000 boat loan. After previous litigation where this court …
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WHATLEY, Judge.
Gerardo Piei appeals the order awarding First Union National Bank of Florida attorney’s fees. We conclude there was no basis for. the fee award and reverse.
In 1991, Pici executed and delivered to First Union a promissory note and security agreement evidencing a loan of approximately $18,000. The loan was related to the purchase of a boat.
This case has a long history, including a previous appeal. Pici v. First Union National Bank of Florida, 621 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In the prior appeal, this court determined that Pici had cured any monetary default before receiving notice of acceleration of the debt. Despite that ruling, the parties continued to litigate. First Union’s continuing claims were for monetary and nonmonetary defaults. Piei was proceeding on his counterclaim. The case was subsequently tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of First Union solely on its replevin claim for possession of the boat. First Union did not prevail on the remainder of its claims, nor did Pici prevail on his counterclaim. The trial court entered a final judgment reserving ruling on First Union’s claim for attorney’s fees. First Union subsequently was awarded fees in the amount of $127,420.
Before proceeding further, we feel compelled to comment on the amount of First Union’s fees which it is seeking Pici to pay. Fees in that amount exceed any definition of reasonableness based on the facts and circumstances of this case.
Piei raises a number of reasons to reverse the attorney’s fee award. We need address only one. The fee award was based on the following contractual language in the promissory note: “ATTORNEY’S FEES: If you hire an attorney to collect what I owe,' I agree to pay your reasonable attorney’s fee, plus court costs.” Attorney’s fee provisions are to be strictly construed. See Venetian Cove Club, Inc. v. Venetian Bay Developers, Inc., 411 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), First Union could have had a fee provision that entitled it to fees for successful pursuit of any breach or default under the note. It did not; The replevin action on which First Union prevailed was based on a nonmonetary default; it was not a claim seeking money owed from Pici. As such, the attorney’s fee provision was never activated.
Accordingly, we reverse First Union’s award of attorney’s fees. This matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
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Wendel v. Wendel, 852 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…s that the term “expenses” should be interpreted to include attorney’s fees. This argument has no merit for two reasons. First, contractual provisions concerning attorney’s fees must be strictly construed. See Pici v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 705 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Venetian Cove Club, Inc. v. Venetian Bay Developers, Inc., 411 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Here, a strict construction of paragraph XIV precludes any award of attorney’s fees because fees are not even mentioned in t…
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RLS Bus. Ventures, Inc. v. Second Chance Wholesale, Inc., 784 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…nt was an action to enforce a provision of the agreement. RLS agreed to a judgment in replevin in favor of Second Chance. Therefore, Second Chance was entitled to its fees under the contractual provision. Cf. Pici v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 705 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that contractual fees for replevin action were not awardable when attorney’s fee clause stated that borrower would pay attorney’s fees if bank “hire[d] an attorney to collect what I owe”; replevin is a nonmonetary def…
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Gibbs Constr. Co. & Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. S. L. Page Corp., 755 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…persons or property occasioned by the Subcontractor.” The present case involved neither an accident to a person nor an accident to property. Contractual attorney’s fee provisions must be [*791] strictly construed. See Pici v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 705 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Applying a strict construction, article VIII was simply inapplicable in reference to claims arising out of the actual work performed by the parties. Thus, Page was not entitled to its fees. Further, the portion of the subsequent…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Venetian Cove Club, Inc. v. Venetian BAY Developers, Inc., 411 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Pici v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 621 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)