CYPRESS BEND CONDOMINIUM I ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER,
v.
PETER DEXNER, RESPONDENT
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Cypress Bend Condominium Association sought a writ of prohibition challenging a circuit court order that denied its motion for summary judgment in a dispute with a condominium unit owner over the timeliness of filing a trial de novo action following an adverse arbitration decision. The court held that the thirty-day filing requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be extended by general mailing rules, rendering the suit untimely.
The thirty-day filing requirement in section 718.1255(4)(c) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B-45.043(2) is a jurisdictional precondition that cannot be extended by the general mailing rule. The circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by denying the motion for summary judgment because Dexner's suit, filed thirty-one days after service, was untimely.
[1] A petition for trial de novo following arbitration must be filed within thirty days of the arbitration order, as this is a jurisdictional precondition.
[2] When specific and general administrative rules conflict, the specific rule prevails over the general rule.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because we find the thirty-day requirement of subsections 61B-45.043(2) and 718.1255(4)(e) to be a jurisdictional precondition to bringing suit under section 718.1255, we believe the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by not granting Cypress Bend's motion.”
Establishes that the thirty-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely procedural
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCypress Bend and Peter Dexner entered into arbitration proceedings regarding Dexner's alleged violation of condominium regulations. An adverse arbitra…
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POLEN, Judge.
Petitioner, Cypress Bend Condominium I Association (Cypress Bend), files this petition for writ of prohibition directed to the circuit court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment. Cypress Bend and respondent, Peter Dexner, entered into arbitration proceedings regarding Dexner’s alleged violation of condominium regulations. Upon entry of an adverse arbitration order, Dexner filed suit seeking a trial de novo pursuant to section 718.1255(4), Florida Statutes (1997).
While the order contained a certificate of service by mail dated May 19, 1997, Dexner did not file his action until June 19, 1997, thirty-one (31) days later. Cypress Bend thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was untimely pursuant to Fla. Adm.Code R. 61B-45.043(2) (1997) and section 718.1255(4)(c), and that the circuit court was without jurisdiction.
The circuit court denied the motion, finding that, since Dexner served a copy of the suit by mail within thirty-five days of the order, it was timely pursuant to Fla. Adm.Code R. 221.6002 (now 60Q-2.002) (adding five days for mailing). Because we find the thirty-day requirement of subsections 61B-45.043(2) and 718.1255(4)(e) to be a jurisdictional precondition to bringing suit under section 718.1255, we believe the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by not granting Cypress Bend’s motion. See Markham v. Moriarty, 575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied sub nom., Abundant Life Christian Centre, Inc. v. Markham, 502 U.S. 968, 112 S.Ct. 440, 116 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991).
To the extent there is any conflict between the administrative rules, we hold that the specific rule, 61B-45.043(2), prevails over the general rule, 221-6002. See Abrahams v. Mimosa Co., 174 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
PROHIBITION GRANTED.
GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.
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Laney v. Hammocks Homeowners Ass'n (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2011)…rvice which shall show the date of mailing of the final order to the parties. The date of mailing of the final order shall be the date used to calculate the deadline for appeal by trial de novo.” In Cypress Bend Condominium I Ass’n., Inc. v. Dexner, 705 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Court found that the requirement that a suit seeking trial de novo upon entry of adverse arbitration order be filed within 30 days of the mailing of the order is a jurisdictional precondition to bringing suit. Therefore, th…
Authorities Cited
- Markham v. Moriarty, 575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Abrahams v. Mimosa Co., Ltd., 174 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Mattei v. Laborers Combined Funds of W. Pa., 502 U.S. 968 (U.S. 1991)
- Bethke v. Baker Motors, 502 U.S. 968 (U.S. 1991)