JAMES L. LAW, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF ORMOND BEACH, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed dismissal of most counts under the four-year statute of limitations but reversed dismissal of counts VI and XIII as timely, remanding for Law to amend those counts to state cognizable causes of action.
Counts barred by the four-year statute of limitations were properly dismissed, but counts VI and XIII alleging 1992 City actions were timely and should not have been dismissed, though they fail to state cognizable causes of action.
[1] A complaint alleging municipal actions occurring within the four-year statute of limitations period is not barred by that limitations period, even if other counts in the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Law filed a fourteen-count complaint against the City of Ormond Beach; the trial court dismissed all counts as barred by the four-year statute o…
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PER CURIAM.
James Law (Law) appeals the trial court’s final order dismissing with prejudice his fourteen-count complaint against the City of Ormond Beach (City). The trial court determined that dismissal was required because all counts were barred by the four-year statute of limitations. § 95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. All counts of Law’s complaint, except counts VI and XIII, were properly dismissed based upon the application of the four-year statute of limitations. Counts VI and XIII should not have been dismissed because they contain allegations pertaining to actions on the part of the City occurring in 1992. As a result, these counts are not barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court’s dismissal order as it pertains to counts VI and XIII. In closing, we note that our review of counts VI and XIII indicates that the allegations set forth therein fail to state a cognizable cause of action. Thus, on remand, the trial court should grant Law the opportunity to amend his complaint to state a cognizable cause of action. See Myers v. Myers, 652 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
HARRIS, PETERSON and ANTOON, JJ., concur.