THOMAS J. KONRAD & ASSOCIATES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN A. MCCOY AND BARNETT BANK, N.A., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1998-01-12
No. 97-295
LAWRENCE and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
705 So. 2d 948 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant Thomas J. Konrad & Associates obtained a money judgment against John McCoy and sought to garnish funds in a bank account held by McCoy and his wife as tenants by the entireties. The trial court dissolved the writ based solely on the tenancy by the entireties status, but the appellate court reversed because the trial court failed to make critical findings regarding whether the funds were placed in the joint account with fraudulent intent to shield them from creditors.


Holding

The writ should not be automatically dissolved merely because the account is held as a tenancy by the entireties. Rather, the trial court must make critical findings regarding whether the funds in the account belong equitably to McCoy individually and whether they were transferred with fraudulent intent to place them beyond creditors' reach.


Headnotes

[1] Funds on deposit in a financial institution are presumed to belong to the person or entity named on the account, but this presumption is not conclusive.

[2] The determinative issue for garnishment purposes is where equitable title to the funds resides, not merely legal title.

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Key Quotes

“For garnishment purposes, funds on deposit in a financial institution are presumed to belong to the person or entity named on the account [...] However, this presumption is not conclusive [...] The determinative issue is where the equitable, as opposed to the bare legal, title to the funds resides.”

Establishes that legal title is not determinative; equitable ownership controls garnishability

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant obtained a money judgment against McCoy in 1995. In 1996, appellant sought to garnish funds in a Barnett Bank account held in the names of M…

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Opinion of the Court
WEBSTER, Judge.

WEBSTER, Judge.

Appellant seeks review of an order dissolving a continuing writ of garnishment. Because the trial court failed to make findings critical to the issue of whether the writ should be dissolved, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant obtained a money judgment against appellee McCoy in 1995. In 1996, it sought to garnish funds in an account at appellee Barnett Bank in the names of McCoy and his wife. After the writ of garnishment had been issued, McCoy moved to dissolve the writ because the account was held by him and his wife as tenants by the entireties. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order dissolving the writ. Its sole justification for doing so was that the account was a tenancy by the entireties and that, as such, it could not be garnished in an effort to satisfy the judgment against McCoy, individually.

Appellant does not dispute that the account is held by the entireties. Rather, it argues (as it did in the trial court) that such a fact is not determinative of its right to garnish the funds. Appellant’s position is that the funds in the account were paid to McCoy after the judgment had been entered, in satisfaction of a debt owed to him, individually; that treating the funds as entireties assets would work a fraud on it; and that, therefore, equity requires that the funds be recognized as belonging to McCoy, alone, notwithstanding their presence in an entire-ties account.

For garnishment purposes, funds on deposit in a financial institution are presumed to belong to the person or entity named on the account. Ginsberg v. Goldstein, 404 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, this presumption is not conclusive. Id. The determinative issue is where the equitable, as opposed to the bare legal, title to the funds resides. Id. Moreover, “[t]he law is clear that a debtor may not transfer property owned by himself, individually, to himself and his wife as tenants by the entire-ties if such a transfer will defraud creditors by putting that property beyond the creditors’ reach.” Valdivia v. Valdivia, 593 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

Appellant’s response to McCoy’s motion to quash the writ was that the funds in the account had been paid to McCoy, individually, after the judgment had been entered, to satisfy a debt owed to McCoy, individually. Appellant argued that, by depositing those funds into the entireties account, the intent had been to put the funds beyond its reach and, thereby, to defraud it. Assuming those claims to be true, it would appear that appellant would be entitled to garnish the funds, notwithstanding their presence in an entire-ties account. However, the trial court failed to make findings on any of these critical issues. Accordingly, we are unable to determine whether its decision to dissolve the writ was correct. Therefore, we reverse and re mand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

LAWRENCE and DAVIS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …funds on deposit in a financial institution are presumed to belong to the person or entity named on the account.” Green v. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Williams, 78 So. 3d 555, 557 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (quoting Thomas J. Konrad & Assocs., Inc. v. McCoy, 705 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). Not only did the account documents show that the account belonged to Amy, BB & T did not produce any evidence to rebut this presumption. BB & T mainly claims that Joseph may have had some equitable interest in the funds or tha…
    1 / 2
  • Green v. Dep't OF Revenue, 78 So. 3d 555 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
    …. Ginsberg v. Goldstein, 404 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). “For garnishment purposes, funds on deposit in a financial institution are presumed to belong to the person or entity named on the account.” Thomas J. Konrad & Assoc., Inc. v. McCoy, 705 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citing Ginsberg, 404 So. 2d at 1099). However, this presumption is not conclusive. Id. The determinative issue is where the equitable, as opposed to the bare legal, title to the funds resides. Id. The underlying facts of t…
  • Havoco OF Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 197 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1999)
    …f. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F. 2d 921, 928 (4th Cir.1985) (interpreting Maryland law). However, when tenancy-by-the-entireties property is created via a fraudulent conveyance, it may be avoided as such. See Thomas J. Konrad & Assoc., Inc. v. McCoy, 705 So. 2d 948 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1998); Valdivia v. Valdivia, 593 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992). See also In re Hendricks, 237 B.R. at 824. Avoiding the transfer which created a tenancy-by-the-entireties will necessarily eliminate the property rights of…

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