BONITA HARGRETT, PETITIONER,
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A., INC., RESPONDENT
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Petitioner Hargrett sought certiorari review of a non-final circuit court order in a Lemon Law dispute, arguing the order improperly allocated the burden of proof. The Fourth District Court of Appeal dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that certiorari does not lie to review non-final interlocutory orders denying motions to dismiss or strike.
Certiorari does not lie to review the non-final order because it is the type of interlocutory order that cannot be reviewed by certiorari under the principles established in Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage. Non-final orders denying motions to dismiss or strike are not proper subjects of interlocutory certiorari review.
[1] Certiorari is not available to review a non-final order denying a motion to dismiss or strike, as such an order is not capable of causing irreparable harm that cannot be…
[2] A non-final order denying a motion to dismiss or strike is generally not reviewable by common law certiorari.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On a petition for certiorari to review a non-final order of the circuit court, we first determine whether the order is capable of causing irreparable harm which cannot be cured on final appeal.”
Establishes the governing standard for certiorari jurisdiction over non-final orders.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHargrett obtained a favorable arbitration result under Florida's Lemon Law (Chapter 681). Toyota filed a petition in circuit court seeking a trial de …
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KLEIN, Judge.
Petitioner obtained a favorable result in an arbitration pursuant to Florida’s Lemon Law, Chapter 681 of the Florida Statutes (1995) and respondent Toyota filed a petition in the circuit court to review that result, seeking a trial de novo. Petitioner interprets a non-final order denying her motion to dismiss or strike in the circuit court proceeding as placing the burden of proof on her in the circuit court proceeding, and argues that this is a departure from the essential requirements of law because the burden of proof in Lemon Law cases being reviewed in the circuit court is on the petitioner. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 689 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 697 So. 2d 1215 (Fla.1997); Aguiar v. Ford Motor Co., 683 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
On a petition for certiorari to review a non-final order of the circuit court, we first determine whether the order is capable of causing irreparable harm which cannot be cured on final appeal. Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire, 670 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Petitioner relies on Mason, which did grant certiorari under similar circumstances; however, the fifth district did not explain in Mason how the order would cause irreparable harm which could not be cured by final appeal. Petitioner also cites Aguiar, in which the third district granted certiorari under similar circumstances, citing Mason as authority for jurisdiction, without addressing irreparable harm.
In Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Fla.1987), our supreme court concluded that certiorari would not lie to review an order denying a motion to dismiss or strike a claim for punitive damages, and observed that permitting “interlocutory appeals by certiorari in this instance would result in unwarranted harm to our system of procedure. The rationale employed in this case could as easily be applied to the erroneous denial of a motion for summary judgment or a motion to join or dismiss a party.”1 The non-final order in the present case is, in our opinion, precisely the type of order which we do not have jurisdiction to review by certiorari under Martin-Johnson. We therefore dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
GLICKSTEIN, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur. . The specific holding in Martin-1 dhnson involving punitive damages has been superseded by section 768.72, Fla. Stat. (1989) as we recognized in Henn v. Sandler, 589 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The remainder of the opinion expressing general principles regarding common law certiorari remains good law.
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Bd. OF Trs. OF the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450 (Fla. 2012)…invoked only when a party will suffer irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal — remains sound law. See Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1134; Forbes, 34 So. 3d at 212; Underwood, 8 So. 3d at 1262; Hargrett v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 705 So. 2d 1009, 1009 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Here, the parties do not dispute the extraordinary nature of certiorari or the standard an appellate court must apply when reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari. Instead, the dispute focuses on whether the Th…
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Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…rlier decision “implicitly held” that which it “didn’t even mention”), review granted sub nom. Gretna Racing, LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, SC15-1929, 2015 WL 8212827 (Fla. Dec. 1, 2015); Hargrett v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 705 So. 2d 1009, 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (rejecting reliance on certiorari decision that presented “similar circumstances” but “did not explain ... how the order would cause irreparable harm which could not be cured by final appeal”). Like the United States Suprem…
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Authorities Cited
- Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987)
- The Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGUIRE, 670 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Henn v. Sandler, 589 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Mason v. Porsche Cars OF N. Am., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Chrysler Corp. v. Spiro Pitsirelos, 689 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Aguiar v. Ford Motor Co., 683 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)