STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
JOSEPH SAL MANCINO, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1998-02-05
No. 90174
OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur., ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
705 So. 2d 1379 Florida Supreme Court (1998) Caution
Cited by 80 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court resolved a certified conflict regarding the proper procedural mechanism for challenging a minimum mandatory firearm sentence when the record lacks evidence of actual firearm possession. The Court held that Rule 3.850, not Rule 3.800(a), is the appropriate vehicle for such challenges because they require evidentiary determinations rather than pure questions of law.


Holding

Rule 3.850, not Rule 3.800(a), is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging the factual basis underlying a minimum mandatory firearm sentence. Rule 3.800(a) motions are limited to sentencing issues resolvable as a matter of law without evidentiary determination, whereas challenges to whether a firearm was actually possessed require factual findings.


Headnotes

[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is limited to sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without…

[2] Challenges to the factual basis underlying the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence, which require an evidentiary determination, are not cognizable as illegal sente…

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Key Quotes

“rule 3.800 motions are "limited to those sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary determination."”

Establishes the core distinction that Rule 3.800(a) applies only to pure legal questions, not factual determinations about firearm possession.

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Facts & Procedural History

Joseph Sal Mancino pled no contest to armed burglary in 1984 and received a four-year sentence with a three-year minimum mandatory for firearm possess…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Senior Justice.

GRIMES, Senior Justice.

We have for review the decision in Mancino v. State, 689 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), which certified conflict with the decisions in Wickline v. State, 687 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Young v. State, 616 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), and which certified the following question to this Court:

AFTER STATE V. CALLAWAY, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995), IS FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.850 RATHER THAN FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.800(a) THE APPROPRIATE POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURAL MECHANISM FOR CONTESTING A THREE-YEAR MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE IMPOSED PURSUANT TO SECTION 775.087(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, ON THE BASIS THAT A FIREARM WAS NOT POSSESSED DURING THE COMMISSION OF ONE OF THE STATUTORILY DESIGNATED FELONIES?

Mancino, 689 So. 2d at 1239. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Joseph Sal Mancino pled no contest in 1984 to armed burglary. Under the terms of the plea agreement, he was sentenced to four years with a three-year minimum mandatory for possession of a firearm. § 775.087(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). In 1996, Mancino filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).1 In that motion, Mancino alleged that the three-year minimum mandatory portion of his sen-fence was illegal because the record lacked any evidence that Mancino had actual possession of a firearm when he committed the felony.2 The trial court concluded that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, not 3.800(a), was the proper procedural vehicle for Mancino’s claim. Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion as time-barred because it had not been filed within the two-year limitation period of rule 3.850.

Following its earlier precedent, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Mancino’s motion had been properly filed under rule 3.800(a). See, e.g., Butchek v. State, 686 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Word v. State, 682 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Brown v. State, 633 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); accord Todd v. State, 659 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The district court of appeal remanded with directions that the trial court determine whether Mancino had manually possessed a firearm during the burglary. The court further stated that if the trial court could make this determination by referring to documents in the record, the trial court could attach those documents to its order denying the motion. Otherwise, the trial court was directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the claim. Mancino, 689 So. 2d at 1237-38. The court certified conflict with Wickline and Young and certified the aforementioned question.

In Wickline, the First District Court of Appeal held that a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a) was not a proper method to challenge the factual basis underlying the three-year minimum mandatory imposed as the result of the defendant’s plea. The Third District Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in Young but authorized the filing of a motion under rule 3.850 for these challenges.

Resolution of the certified conflict is controlled by our decisions in State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995), and Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1995). In Callaway, we concluded that an alleged Hale3 sentencing error was not cognizable as an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a) because resolution of the issue required an evidentiary determination. We explained that rule 3.800 motions are “limited to those sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary determination.” Callaway, 658 So. 2d at 988. That same day we issued Davis, in which we stated that for purposes of rule 3.800(a), an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense. See also Lee v. State, 679 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1996) (holding that trial court’s failure to consider the defendant for youthful offender status, while error, did not render defendant’s sentence illegal under rule 3.800(a) because it did not exceed the maximum prescribed for the committed offense).

Mancino’s motion attacked the factual basis for the imposition of the minimum mandatory and did not allege that his sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. Thus, rule 3.850 rather than rule 3.800(a) was the proper procedural vehicle for Maneino to challenge his minimum mandatory sentence, and we answer the certified question accordingly.4 Because the two-year period within which Maneino could file a motion under rule 3.850 has long since past, his claim must be denied.

We approve Wickline and Young. We quash the decision below and disapprove Butchek, Word, Brown, and Todd to the extent they conflict with this decision.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. .Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) presently states:

(a) Correction. A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing guideline scoresheet.

. Inexplicably, it appears that Mancino had not yet served out his minimum mandatory sentence.

. Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), held that the habitual offender statute does not authorize the imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode.

. We do not address here whether Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(d), enacted in 1996, would preclude relief even under rule 3.850 if a motion to correct the alleged sentencing error had not been made pursuant to newly enacted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).

Dissent
ANSTEAD, Justice,

ANSTEAD, Justice,

dissenting.

At the very least, since the Second District has consistently taken the position that rule 3.800 may be properly utilized under the circumstances of this case, we should not deny relief to the defendant here who has acted to his detriment in reliance on the Second District’s long line of cases on this issue.

KOGAN, C. J., and SHAW, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (44 total)

  • State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)
    …n the opinion below: Spencer appeals from an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.800(a). We determine that the trial court properly denied relief. See State v. Mancino, 705 So. 2d 1379, 1381 (Fla.1998). We do, however, find that the trial court did not follow the proper procedures when it determined that it would not entertain any further pro se challenges to Spencer’s 1992 conviction and sentence. Prior to the imposition of sanct…
  • Leath v. State, 805 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
    …s. Concerning case numbers 94-5647 and 95-0242, Leath did not allege that his claim could be determined from the face of the record. Therefore, the claim was facially insufficient and properly denied. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a); see State v. Mancino, 705 So. 2d 1379 (Fla.1998). As to case number 94-4453, Leath made two arguments in his motion. First, he asserted that there was no factual basis shown in support of the minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a firearm. The trial court properly denied relief…
  • Adams v. State, 755 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …e court has also recently confined prisoners to the strictures of rule 3.850, including its time limitations, when dealing with the application of related issues questioning the propriety of minimum mandatory firearm sentences. See State v. Mancino, 705 So. 2d 1379 (Fla.1998) (holding that rule 3.850 is the exclusive postconviction vehicle available to test whether a prisoner factually qualified for a mandatory firearm sentence). Adams’ convictions and sentences predated Palmer. Bass in 1988 gave retroactive…

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