RANDY LOVE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the facts known to the deputy did not rise to the level of founded suspicion required for an investigatory stop.
[1] An investigatory stop requires a founded suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, and a mere hunch or bare suspicion is insuff…
[2] A founded suspicion for an investigatory stop must have a factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA deputy stopped a vehicle late at night because it was driving slowly in a neighborhood where burglaries had occurred and was a type of car often sto…
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PER CURIAM.
Randy Love appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine after pleading no contest and reserving the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the cocaine was seized as a result of an illegal stop of Love’s vehicle, we reverse.
Deputy Lewis testified that he first observed Love’s vehicle around 3 a.m. driving slowly through a neighborhood. His attention was drawn to the car because it was a late model Toyota. He got behind the vehicle and ran a check on the tag. It was registered to an address located in the direction away from that in which vehicle was traveling. The car had not been reported as stolen. The deputy testified that he stopped the vehicle to do a field interview because he had a suspicion that the driver was casing homes. His suspicion was based on the fact that there had been burglaries in the area, the car was a type that is commonly stolen and it was being driven at a speed of approximately 20 mph in a 35 mph zone.
To justify an investigatory stop, a law en-forcemént officer must have a founded suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). A hunch or bare suspicion of illegal activity cannot justify a stop. The suspicion must “have some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer when those circumstances are interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge.” Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
We are unwilling to hold that driving slowly late at night, in a type of vehicle that is often stolen, in a neighborhood that has had burglaries at some unspecified time in the past will justify an investigatory stop. Therefore, we hold that the facts known to Deputy Lewis at the time he stopped Love’s vehicle do not rise to the level of founded suspicion.
Because the trial court erred by denying Love’s motion to suppress, we reverse and remand with directions that Love’s motion to suppress be granted.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
PATTERSON, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
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Bain v. State, 730 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…llegal sentences to be fundamental error, and reviewable as such. See Nelson v. State, 719 So. 2d 1230, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (general division en bane); McDaniel v. State, 704 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), opinion corrected, 706 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Jordan v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2130, 728 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). As we will explain in depth below, we disagree with Maddox. In our view, certain sentencing errors are fundamental, and for that reason we have jurisdi…
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Grant v. State, 718 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…ed criminal activity cannot be met under these facts. § 901.151, Fla. Stat.; see also, State v. Wimbush, 668 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). This court recently reviewed the issue of a founded suspicion under similar circumstances. In Love v. State, 706 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), this court set forth the facts as follows: Deputy Lewis testified that he first observed Love’s vehicle around 3 a.m. driving slowly through a neighborhood. His attention was drawn to the ear because it was a late model Toyota.…
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Faunce v. State, 884 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…186 (Fla.1993); § 901.151(2) Fla. Stat. (2003). A hunch or a mere suspicion is not enough. As the Florida courts have explained, the officer must be able to articulate the supporting facts, and the suspicion must be well-founded. See Love v. State, 706 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In determining whether a police officer had a reasonable suspicion to detain an individual, the courts must examine the totality of the circumstances in which the detention was made. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)